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SUMMARY:

0\L

Federal/Civil

CA7 (Sprech er,
Dumbauld)
•r imely

The appellant, Secretary of State of Illinois, contests

the conclusion of the courts below that the Illinois Business Take-Over
Act confl.icts with the Williams Act amendme nts to the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act.

He also contests their conclusion that it violates the

- 2 -

FACTS:

Appellant is charged with administration and enforcement

of the Illinois Business Take-Over Act.

The appellees, MITE and MITE

Holdings, are Delaware corporations with their principal executive
offices in New Haven, Connecticut.

The appellees attempted to make a

cash tender offer for the shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine Company,
a publicly-held Illinois corporation with its principal executive
offices in Illinois, without having to comply with the Illinois Act.
Pursuant to

§

14 (d) (1) of the Williams Act, 15

u.s.c.

§

78 (d) (1), they

filed a Schedule 14D-l with the SEC concerning the proposed offer.
MITE's tender offer of $28 per share for all the shares of Chicago
Rivet represented a $4 premium over the market price preceding the
offer.
The same day it filed its Schedule 14D-l with the SEC, MITE fil e d
this suit in the district court, seeking to have the Illinois Act
declared null and void on its face because it violated the Supremacy
Clause and the Commerce Clause.

Three days later, Chic a go Rivet fi le d

a complaint in equity in the Court of . Common Pleas of Blair County,
Pennsylvania, seeking to enjoin MITE from proceeding with its tend er
offer because MITE was purportedly in

------

Takeover Disclosure Law.

---------

violatio~

of the Pennsylvani a

Chicago Rivet alleged th a t MITE's tender

offer was subject to the Pennsylvania Act because Ch i cago Rivet had
its principal place of business and substantial assets in the stat e .
The Pennsylvania court issued an ex parte order granting Ch i cago Riv e t
a temporary injunction.
On the same day that it filed its Pen nsylvani a action, back in the
Northern District of Illinois, Chicago Ri vet moved to dismiss · MITE' s
challenge to the Illinois Act on the grounds that ther e wa s no cas e or
controv e rsy.

The Illinoi s court, by con s0 nt of th e pa r ti es , o r d ered

-

3 -

that neither Chicago Rivet nor the Secretary would be allowed to file
any action against MITE under the Illinois Act without two days notice.
It otherwise continued MITE's requests for injunctive relief regarding
the Act.
The following day, MITE removed the Pennsylvania action to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Pennsylvania.
It then filed its own action in that court seeking to have that state's
Act declared unconstitutional.

Meanwhlle, the Pennsylvania Securities

Commission announced that it would not proceed against MITE.

This, and

other setbacks in the Pennsylvania litigation, prompted Chicago Rivet
and the Illinois Secretary of State to reinstitute the action under the
Illinois Act.
The Secretary concluded that MITE was about to violate the Illinois
Act.

He notified MITE that he was about to issue a cease and desist

order.

Chicago Rivet notified MITE that it would file suit in Circuit

Court for Cook County to restrain MITE from making the tender offer.
MITE renewed its request for relief in the Illinois federal district
court, and the district court judge preliminarily enjoined the state
from issuing the cease and desist order.

I

MITE then published its

tender offer, which represented a $23,000,000 transaction, in the Wall

Street
- - - Journal's national edition.
The district court later issued its final order declaring the Act

null and void because it was preempted by the Williams Act and becau se
it created an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause.
Three days later, pursuant to a written agreement with the Ch icagc
Rivet Company, MITE withdrew its tender offer.

That agreement provid •

that MITE would have until March 5, 1979, to investigate Chicago Rive

- 4 and that it would have until March 12, 1979, to renew its offer.

If it

did not renew the offer by March 12, it would not at any time in the
future acquire Chicago Rivet.

On March 2, MITE announced it would not

be renewing its offer.
HOLDING BELOW:

CA7 affirmed, agreeing with both conclusion s of

the district court.

It did not believe the case was moot because it

felt that, if it reversed the district court, MITE, having made an
offer, would be liable for penalty under the Illinois Act.
CA7 found that the Illinois Act "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."

Hines v Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67.

In CA7's view, th e

Williams Act protects investors by a ''market approach" and is designed
to preserve a neutral balance between incumbent managemer.t and the
offeror.

The Illinois Act upsets that bal a nce.

Henc e , the Illinoi s

Act is preempted by the Williams Act and violates the Supremacy Clause.
CA7 also found that Illinois' interests in protecting resident
shareholders and regulating control transf e rs are tenuous and cannot
justify the Illinois Act's effect on interstate commerce.

The Illinoi s

statute undeniably slows the process of tender offers, depressing the
volume of such activ i ty.

Had the Secreta r y of State enjoined this

transaction, over $23 million dollars of interstate commerce would
have been affected.
CONTENTIONS:

The appellant argues th a t this case raises impo r tant

issues because the great majority of stat e s have statute s si mil ar t o
the one that was invalidated here.

CA7 e r red in holding th a t th e Act

was preempted by the Williams Act.

Th e Court has he ld that th e s o l e

purpose of that Act was to protect investors confronted with a t e nder
offer.

Congr es s did not bar state regul a tion, and the Court h as no t ed

- 5 -

that§ 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "was plainly
intended to protect, rather than to limit, state authority."
Great Western United, 443 U.S. 173, 182.

Leroy v

The Williams Act does not

contain language expressly preempting concurrent state regulation, and
CA7 did not hold that the federal scheme of regulating tender offers
was sufficiently pervasive to indicate a congressional intent to occupy
the field.

Absent explicit or implicit preemption, the validity of

the Illinois Act depends upon whether it "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."

Hine~

v Davidowitz, supra.

The Illinois Act does not

stand as an obstacle to evenhandedness between management and the
offeror; it merely provides added protection to the investor who is
confronted with the offer.
On the Commerce Clause issue, the appellant argues lhat the
Illinois Act serves legitimate local interests and does so without
discriminating against interstate commerce.
many connections with Illinois.
Illinois residents.

Chicago Rivet has very

43% of it common stock is held by

Protecting investo~s residing in a state has long

been recognized as a legitimate state objective.
242 U.S. 539, 551.

Hall v Geiger-Jones,

Moreover, by analogy to its authority to regulate

the internal affairs of a corporation, a state may regulate tender
offers consistently with the Commerce Clause.
The appellees respond that the decision b e low is plainly correct
and that, in any case, the circumstances of this case make it

briefi~g

and argument inappropriate.
First, the decision below clearly and thoroughly discusses the
merits of the constitutional questions and is consistent with the onl y
other CA decision to address the constitutionality of a state tak e -ov0

- 6 statute.

....,

on

venu~

Great Western United v Kidwell, .S71 F2d 12S6 (CAS), reversed
grounds sub nom Leroy v Great

Weste~n

United.

Second, there is no longer a case or controversy.

MITE has

withdrawn its tender offer and, by written agreement, cannot make an
offer again.

And, MITE would not be liable for penalties because it

acted under cover of the district court's ruling.
Finally, the appellees assert that it is significant that the
federal law applicable ~o tender offers has significantly changed
subsequent to the district court opinion below.
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l et
state statutes.

------------

DISCUSSION:

~

(1980) effectively preempt inconsistent

A decision in this case would not reach those rules.

---

The questioR of the constitutionality of state

takeover statutes is an important one.
I

SEC Rules appearing

The question was before the

Court in Leroy v Great Western United Corp, 443 U.S. 173; however, the

/

Leroy Court decided that case on venue grounds and did not reach the
questions of the preemption and the Commerce Clause.
found Idaho's takeover statute unconstitutional.
Illinois statute unconstitutional.

In Leroy, CAS

Here, CA7 found

A district court has upheld the

Ohio takeover statute against a preemption and Commerce Clause attack
similar to those presented here.
482 F.Supp. 929

AMCA International Corp v Krouse,

(S.D. Ohio 1979).

There is a potential problem

~ith

regard to mootness.

In my view,

however, since the Secretary has indicated that he intends to continue
the enforcement action against MITE if he prevails, the issues are not
(

moot.

Moreover, it is probably character i stic of this type of case

that the tend er offer is withdrawn during litigation.

Thus, it may be

that the "capable of repitition while avo i ding review" exception would
apply.

- 7 In light of the new SEC regulations, it would be better to note in
a case that brought them before the Court.

Nonetheless, this case

does present important issues on the merits.
For the moment, I recommend calling for the views of the SG.

With

a caveat ·on the issue of mootness, the Court probably will find that
it should note.
There is a response.
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federal court's injunction against stste prosecution.
2.

Whether Illinois' tender offer statute is preempt-

ed by the Williams Act.
3.

Whether Illinois' tender offer statute contravenes

the Commerce Clause.

I.
Resps Mite

Background

sued petr

Illinois

the

same day--January

19,

1979--that

Mite

Rivet's shares.
enforcing

its

commenced

a

tender

offer

for

Chicago

Mite's suit sought to retrain Illinois from
tender

offer

J4

statute.

· t er a 1'1a, f 1'1'1ng o f a no t 1ce
·
1n
of

This /\statute

requires,

ten d er o ff er w1· th the state

officials and completion of a _
20-day
_ . . waiting
. _ _ _period, and con-

9-~ ·

&-~

templates the possibility that Illinois would hold hearings to
adjudicate whether the offer "is inequitable or would work or
tend to work a fraud •
Chicago Rivet

"

App., 54a.

instigated

skirmishing

courts.

When this proved unavailing,

returned

to

Illinois.

in Pennsylvania

the focus of the fight

On February 1,

1979,

Illinois

warned

Mite that it intended to serve it with a cease and desist order
on February 5.

The DC entered a preliminary injunction enjoin-

ing enforcement of the Illinois

law on February 2.

lished its tender offer on February 5.
Rivet also commenced an offer for

Mite pub-

That same day, Chicago

its own stock.

The DC en-

tered a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against
Illinois

on February 9, declaring that Illinois' law both was

preempted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause.
On February 12, Chicago Rivet and Mite agreed to withdraw

their

mutual

decide whether

offers.

Mite was given 30 days to

it would either make an unopposed offer at a

stipulated

higher

efforts

acquire

to

tender

price

or

refrain

Chicago Rivet.

latter course on March 2, 1979.

permanently

from

Mite decided

to

further
take

the

On October 17, 1980, the CA 7

affirmed on both preemption and Commerce Clause grounds.

C1/ 7

CJffd
djkv
~~

~~

~ft-v~
/~~~

~~~

~:;v~ · ~
II.
A.

Discussio~

.

Mootness

/

Mite contends both in its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm
and in its brief that this action is moot.

Mite reasons that

it did not purchase any Chicago Rivet shares before February
12.

The Mite-Chicago Rivet

bars

Mite

from

future

agreement of

tender

offers

February 12,

against

Chicago

1979,
Rivet.

Therefore the only basis for continuing Mite liability is for
its past violation of the Illinois Act.

Since Mite was pro-

tected by the the DC's injunction against Illinois' enforcement
during this period, Mite asserts that it can no longer be prosecuted due to its reliance on the DC's protection.

Therefore

this controversy is moot.
Analysis on this point is hampered by the fact
Illinois

never

answers

problem in note 14 of
mance

the

argument.

The

SG

discussed

that
the

its initial amicus brief urging af fir-

(but not in his full brief on the merits).

His position

was that "the realistic possibility of enforcement proceedings
based on

appellees'

past conduct may be

sufficient

to avoid

mootness in this case" (emphasis added).
Mite's contrary argument has
federal.
can be

----

two prongs:

state and

The state argument asserts that no criminal liabli ty
imposed

for

action ta,ken in reliance

opinion, as a matter of Ill law.

~

a federal CA

See Mite brief at 12 n. 9.

This is unavailing because it does not foreclose the possibility of civil liability.

Moreover, Mite relied only on the DC

'*•

opinion; the CA decision was not rendered until well after the
disputed activity had ceased by agreement.
Mite's federal argument is that it would violate Due
Process to subject it to state penalties for action taken in
reliance

on

the

DC's

injunction

against

state

prosecution.

This argument turns on the effect to be given to the DC's injunction against state prosecution.
On one hand, Illinois could argue that Mite's reliance
should have been informed by the awareness that the DC order is
not

unconditional.

final

Because a

federal appellate court is the

judge of the DC order, Mite's reasonable reliance thus

cannot be absolutely free of risk.

Mite must be charged with

knowledge of the vulnerability of the DC authority upon which
it relied.
this

It therefore cannot complain of unfair surprise if

foreseeable

comes to pass.

risk--reversal of

the DC on appeal--in fact

State prosecution thus is not unfairly surpris-

ing, goes the argument, and should not violate Due Process.
On the other hand, it can be argued this argument accords

insufficient

that,

if

authority

to

DC

orders.

Mite

could

say

it were willing to act with risk of prosecution, if

could have proceeded to violate state law and raised its federal claims as defenses

to that state prosecution.

function of declaratory judgment and
when

permitted 1 --is

to

eliminate

The entire

injunction proceedings--

that

risk

of

prosecution.

1 Federal injunctions against state prosecutions raise Younger
v. Harris concerns.
Illinois has made no abstention claims, alFootnote continued on next page.

Mite acted as swiftly as it could have to obtain the injunction

though it appears it would have had at least an arguable case for
Younger abstention. The Illinois law is backed by both criminal
and civil penalties.
See App., 60a-62a. The Younger abstention
doctrine applies to both sorts of prosecutions.
See, e.g.,
Juidice v. Vail, 430 u. S. 327 (1977).
It appears that Mite
would have an opportunity to raise its federal defenses in state
proceedings; the Illinois statute authorizes remedies to be imposed by state courts and there has been no showing that Illinois
procedural law would bar assertion of federal defenses.
See
Moore v. Sims, 442 u.S. 415, 432 (1979). Although the timing-of
this situation would demand an expedited decision, that would be
true in federal court as well. Finally, it is doubtful that Mite
would be able to claim, by virtue of bad faith state prosecution
or a flagrantly unconstitutional statute, see id. at 424, that
this case should be treated as an exception to Younger's usual
policy.
There are three reasons, however, why Younger probably
should have no relevance to this case.
First, it is not clear
that Illinois' interest in enforcing its tender offer law is so
strong as to resemble "vi tal concerns [such] as enforcement of
contempt proceedings • • • or the vindication of 'important state
policies such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of [public
assistance] programs' . • • • " Moore v. Sims, 442 u. s. at 423;
see also id. at n.8.
Second, it is likewise not clear whether the state administrative proceedings were sufficiently advanced or of sue~
character as to call Younger's policies into play. Here the federal complaint had been filed prior to any Illinois administrative proceedings. The DC adjourned its proceedings on the order
that neither Chicago Rivet not Illinois initiate action against
Mite without two days notice to Mite and the DC. On February 1,
the Illinois Secretary of State issued a cease and desist order
against Mite's tender offer and notified that it would serve this
order on Mite on February 5.
The DC enjoined the Ilinois enforcement on February 2.
Compare Hicks v. Miranda, 422 u. s.
332, 349 (1975)
("where state criminal proceedings are begun
against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is
filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have
taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v.
Harris should apply with full force")
(emphasis added), with
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 u. S. 922, 930 (1975) (plaintiff
may challenge the const1tutionalty of a state statute in federal
court in the absence of "an on-going state criminal proceeding,"
even though state criminal prosecution is imminent).
Third, and most importantly, Illinois has raised no
Younger claim. Younger is a federal rule of comity. Although I
have found no authority for this proposition, it seems most reaFootnote continued on next page.

0.

against state prosecution.

Once it won this relief, it could

not, as the winning party, appeal for further certainty.
task was then Illinois'.

That

Had Illinois wished to preserve its

right to prosecute in the face of imminent Mite behavior authorized by the DC, Illinois should have sought both to have the
DC's order stayed pending review as well as expedited appeal.
Since

it did neither,

this argument would conclude,

Illinois

has forfeit its right to prosecute.
The latter reasoning makes the most sense to me.
other

position

unstayed DC

will

remove

injunction

federal decisions.

the

authority

an

Any

unappealed

and

should carry as a means of enforcing

Despite the fact that Mite has been able to

find only one old CA opinion to support its position directly,
see United States v.

Mancuso, 139 F.2d 90,

92

(CA3 1943),

I

think this is the better view.
On this logic, the threat of mootness is real.
circumvented only
repetition
requires
same

yet

that

if

this case

evading
11

there

complaining

review 11

[is]

party

a

would

falls

within the

category.

reasonable
be

subject

sonable that such a federalism concern
the State--the party that the doctrine
invoke it. Because Illinois continues
point, I think the Court should just
some end not now apparent to me would
tion.
Complete omission of reference
little, if any, precedential weight.

But

11

Capable of

this

expectation
to

the

It is

category
that

same

the

action

can be deemed waived when
seeks to protect--does not
its failure to mention the
ignore this issue--unless
be served by its utilizato Younger will have very

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
curiam)

(emphasis added).

agreement

bars

~-

Mite

u.s.

(1975)

(per

-----

In this case, the Chicago Rivet/Mite

from

attempting

--------

against Chicago Rivet.

147, 149

another

tender

offer

And no party even alleges that there is

a "reasonable expectation" that Mite will make tender offers
for other Illinois companies.
I conclude the case is moot.

"The established prac-

tice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in
the federal system which has become moot while on its way here

---

---~

United States v. Munsingwear, 340

B.

u. s.

36, 39

(1950).

Preemption

Assuming that the case is not moot, the first issue on
the merits

is whether

Illinois statute.
whether

the federal Williams Act preempts the

The parties agree that the relevant test is

the state law "stands as an obstancle to the accom-

plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
2
Congress" in enacting the Williams Act.
Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U. S.

52, 67

(1941).

See Petr brief at 15: Resp brief at

2This preemption test slao is codified in the federal Act:
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission • • . of any State over any security or any
person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 u.s.c.
§78bb (a) •

8.

30; SG brief at 5.

Mite and the SG cqntend that three

of the Illinois law are objectionable:

eatures

vision

'5 G :r-

fo~~

state hearings of potentially unlimited
commencement notification requirement;

its authoriza-

substantive "equity" of the

tion of a decision
proposed offer.

they have a strong argument on each

point.

1.
The

Illinois

State hearings

law does

require that hearings be held

of the target shares.

Illinoi~

residents holding

See §137.57(A), App., 53a.

The hearings

the protection of the offerees in this State."

App., at 53a-54a.

"[T]he take-over shall not become registered

until so declared by order of the Secretary," id. at 53a, and
the Secretary shall make a determination "within 15 business
days after the conclusion of the hearing, unless such time is
extended by order of the Secretary • • • • "

Id. at 54a.

The

Illinois Act consequently provides for an admisistrative mechanism that probably can be

-

invoked at the behest of incumbent

m anagement and that, on its face, offers no assurance of swift
completion.

in

1/t

In enacting the Williams Act, the Court has noted that

"Congress

"

expressly

disclaimed

an

intention

to

~

10% ~

are to commence with 10 days of the request unless the date is
extended "for

.

~

upon the request of the Secretary of State; a majority of the
target's outside directors; or

9..?6

provide

a

weapon for management to discourage takeover bids • • • •

In-

deed, the Act's draftmen commented on the 'extreme care' which
was taken 'to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in
favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover

bid.

[citing

Senate

and

Mosinee Paper Co. , 422 U. S.

House

49, 58-59

reports]"
(197 5) •

Rondeau

v.

In short, the

Williams Act seeks to maintain a neutrality in affecting the
outcome of takeover bids.
There seems to be little doubt that forcing delay is a
known weapon

in

confirmed

the

by

tender offer battles.
portion

Improvements Act's
~

of

the

This understanding

is

Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti trust

legislative history that the SG quotes at

•(~~ "1
~

~

~

10-11 of his brief:
[I]t is clear that this short [ten-day] waiting period was founded on congressional concern that a longer delay might unduly favor
the target firm's incumbent management, and
permit them to frustrate ~a ~ pr ~-~ompet Ltive
cash tenders.
This ten- ay wa1t1ng period
~ores the basic purpose of the Williams Act--to maintain a neutral policy towards cash tender offers, by avoiding lengthy
delays that might discourage their chances for
success.

~·

This legislative history establishes a fact that can
be verified in professional commentary:

delay is a tender of-

fer tool typically used only by incumbent management in tender
offer

defense.

See,

e.g.,

Great

Kidwell, 577 F. 2d 1256, 1278 n. 49
ties).

Although

there

western

United

(CAS 1978)

Corp.

v.

(citing author i-

is much debate about whether delaying

tender offers does or does not benefit consumers,

see, e.g.,

7~~

~
-~

~

/- M~~~~
App.,

20a-2la, it does seem clear that delay

incumbents
statute
policy:
----...._,

and

hurt

stands

as

On

this

bas s,

in tender

the

ement of

an obstacle

neutrality
.___

convincing

offerors.

nds to benefit

offer fights.

reply to this point.

~
~I

Illinois
federal

Illinois has no

See petr brief at 20-21.

I

conclude the Williams' Act is preemptive on this point.

2.

Pre-commencement notification

Illinois' tender offer law specifies that it is unlawful "for any person to make a take-over offer unless the take-

App., 49a.

"A take-over offer shall become registered 20 busi-

ness days after the filing of the registration statement

"

§l37.54(E),

App.,

52a.

The

statute

thus

requires

that

offerors make their detailed disclosures well before they are
actually permitted to make their tender offers. 3
The SG argues that Congress has considered such a precommencement notification provision on six different occasions,'
but has refused to enact such a measure due to the imbalance it
would create in tender offer fights.
islative history is found at 15.

His most persuasive leg-

There he quotes a vice presi-

3The SEC subsequently promulgated federal
regulations that
would prohibit state pre-commencement notification provisions.
See SG brief at 5-6 n.5. T e authority so to act is disputed. See amicus brief of irgini at 3-5. In any event, these
regulations by their timing
apply to this suit.

dent of the New York Stock Exchange stating that disclosure of
the offer price in advance of the offer will tend to drive the
stock price toward that level.
purchase

efforts;

price or will

either

suffer

This will hamper the offeror's

the offeror

raise

its

The SG's argument thus is similar

to the hearing delay provisions:
finger

to

the loss of the offer premium that was

calculated to induce sales.

puts a

will have

on the tender of fer

that the Illinois provision
scale

(in favor of

incum-

bents), while the federal policy is to maintain neutrality.
I find this contention persuasive in view of Illinois'
weak rebuttal.

Illinois simply cites to DeCanas v. Bica, 424

U. S.

(1976) ,

351,

360

rejection of

a

for the proposition that congressional

provision does not mean states are precluded

from adopting similar provisions.
deed, Congress'

Illinois brief at 19.

"In-

failure to enact such general sanctions rein-

forces the inference that Congress believes this problem does
not

yet

require

uniform

national

rules

and

addressed by the States as a local matter."
n.9.

No doubt

this

is a logical

is
424

appropriately

u.

S., at 360

inference to draw for

some

types of provisions in the absence of explicit legislative history.

But

the explicit legislative history language and re-

peated congressional rejections convince me that the SG has the
better

side of

this debate.

Therefore

I

think

the

Illinois

pre-commencement notification provision also is preempted.

3.

Review of substantive fairness

The final aspect of the Illinois statute is its provision that the Secretary may deny the tender offer's registration.

He

is authorized

to do this,

inter alia,

if he finds

"that the take-over offer is inequitable, or would tend to work
a fraud or deceit upon the offerees . . •
54a

(emphasis added).

"

§l37.57(E), App.,

The Williams Act's purpose, however, is

"to make the relevant facts known so that the shareholders have
a fair opportunity to make their decision."
(quoting House and Senate reports)
trast between a
tecting

(emphasis added).

"regulatory" and a

investors

is,

I

believe,

SG brief at 12-13
This con-

"market" approach to prothe

plainest

federal/state

conflict in this case and the most likely candidate for preemption.

(Illinois' argument that its law does not authorize the

Secretary to make substantive judgment about the fairness of an
offer is contrary to the words of the statute and is otherwise
unsupported. See Illinois brief at 21-22 & n.8.)

My conclusion therefore is that the Williams Act preempts all three objectionable portions of the Illinois statute.
The Court need not rule on the possible preemption of the remainder of the Act; these three sections are the only ones Mite
and

the SG attack.

By

t~e

sufficient to affirm the CA7.
I

same

~oken,

this holding would be

The Commerce Clause issue--which

turn to next--would be at most an alternative route to the

same result.

C.

Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause is always difficult, in large measure due to the ad hoc nature of the law in this area.
wrote

in Raymond Motor Transport,

gions

"experience teaches

identifies all of

the

case."

429,

434 U.

S.

Inc.

v. Rice,

As you

in these re-

that no single conceptual approach

factors
441

that may bear on a particular

(1978) •

The most widely accepted

generalization seems to be Justice Stewart's from Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397

u.

s. 137, 142 (1970).

There he wrote:

Where the statute regulates [1] evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate local interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld [ 2] unless the
burden
imposed
is
clearly
excessive
in
raltionship to the putative local benefits • .
If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate activities.
[Emphasis added.]
This

statement

is most

usefully

broken down

into

a

two-part test for this case:

(1)

Is the Illinois Act parochi-

al or evenhanded regulation?

As your opinion in Kassle v. Con-

solidated Freightways Corp., 101 s.ct. 1309 (1981) shows, this
Court is willing to scrutinize local justifications very closely if it suspects that regulation is not being imposed on an
evenhanded basis.

(2)

If evenhanded, does the regulation nev-

ertheless have an excessive

impact on interstate commerce

in

comparison to the weight of the local interests thereby served?
I organize my discussion around these two inquiries

1.

Parochial or evenhanded regulation?

This choice of characterizatio'n turns on whether the
Illinois act primarily is viewed as a effort to guard its resident

consumers

(of

securities)

against potential failings

in

the securities market (such as fraud or imperfect information),
or as an attempt to shield the incumbent management of its resident corporations from the threat of acquisition in the national market for subsidiaries.

The former is the type of wel-

fare regulation generally sustained under Commerce Clause attack.

See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria,

341 u. S. 622

(1951)

(upholding municipal privacy ordinance that banned unconsented
door-todoor

solicitations

by

in- and out-of-state

California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109

(1941)

salesmen);

(upholding state

licensing of ticket agents selling inter- and intrastate tours,
as a means of limiting fraud).
economic
markets
lenge.

favoritism
that

aimed

has proved

at

The latter seems the type of
insulating

vulnerable

local

from

national

to Commerce Clause chal-

See, e.g., Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935)

validating

state effort

to protect

local dairy

farmers

(infrom

lower priced out-of-state competition).
On one hand, the Illinois Act does protect local economic interests from competition in the national marketplace to
some

extent.

As

the

previous

section

explained,

the

Act's

three objectionable provisions can make it harder for a national buyer searching for a subsidiary to purchase those corporations subject to the act--which are only corporations with a

close nexus with Illinois. 4

In this sense, the Illinois Act to

a degree protects Illinois management from national competitors
who be·lieve that they could manage more efficiently.

The Illi-

nois Act consequently does have a parochial element.
This element, however, has at most a marginal efect.
Although delay may tend to favor

incumbents, the Act's provi-

sian's do not purport--and in all likelihood do not act--to ban
completely all acquisitions of
The

impediments

to purchase

Illinois-related corporations.

are

more

subtle.

This marginal

effect may be sufficiently upsetting in the preemption context-where

the

test

obstructed.
against

is whether

But

the

federal

marginality

characterizing

the

statutory objectives
of

this

Illinois Act

as

effect

are

militates

wholly parochial

legislation.
Similarly,

the

impediments

are

imposed

across

the

board; there is no more favorable treatment of Illinois-related
purchasers.

In addition, the Illinois Act has a "comity" pro-

vision specifying that the Act does not apply if the Illinois
Secretary

of

State

determines

that

other

jurisdictions have

regulations that "afford protection to securityholders located

4 "Target companies" that can invoke the Illinois Act's protection must
1. have 10% of security holders located in Illinois, or
2. satisfy two of the following three conditions:
a. principle executive office in Illinois;
b. organized under Illinois law; or
c. at 10% of capital "represented in" Illinois.
§137.52-10, App., 48a.

in

this State

this Act."

substantially equal to that afforded

§137.53, App., 49a (emphasis added).

evidenee of consumer protection is ambiguous

• by

Although this

(as it could be

said that "protection to securityholders" is simply a euphemism
referring
offers) ,

to

comparable

provisions

that

obstruct

tender

its language does point to a concern with consumer,

rather than incumbent management, protection.
Finally

and

most

importantly,

Illinois

consumer protection arguments for its regulation.
brief

at

25.

Unlike

Iowa's

safety arguments

does

advance

See Illinois

in Kassel

(and

Wisconsin's safety assertions in Raymond Motor), Illinois' consumer protection arguments must be credited with some weight.
After all, the federal government has seen fit to impose generally similar regulations via the Williams Act.
able
tion,

characterization
I

think

the

of

welfare/consumer

Illinois

act

probably

Given this ten-

protection
should

regula-

survive

the

first prong of this two part Commerce Clause test.

2.

Excessive impact on interstate commerce

compared to strength of the local justification?
Illinois'

law clearly applies

interstate commerce.

The

facts of

to

a

large

volume

of

this case illustrate that

some $23 million in interstate security purchases were at issue.

Although the Illinois Act does not by its terms prevent

such commerce,

it

does

regulate

impact on interstate commerce.

.J:..t.

This

regulation has an

Two features of this impact are

important.
The first

is the magnitude of the impact.

As previ-

ously explained, the primary effect is delay--with the potential

that

the

Illinois

Secretary

of

tender offer invalid as "inequitable."
(Neither the CA 7, Mite,

nor

State will declare

the

See pages 10-11 supra.

the SG have complained about the

additional disclosure requirements imposed by the Illinois act.
I therefore disregard these.)
hard to pinpoint.
i ted

delay

but

The magnitude of the impact is

The statute provides for potentially unlim-

has

corresponding

exceptions

that

permit

the

Secretary, in his discretion, to limit or accelerate the process.

But the minimum typical case would appear to involve a

15 business day period from the time of the offeror's notice of
offer,
from

see §13 7. 57
the

time

(A) ,

of

ApP-.-,

request

§137.57(C), App., 53a, and
pletely

speculative

53a,
to

a

the

10

business day period

time

of

hearing,

see

(assuming a one-day hearing--a com-

assumption),

a

15

business

day

from

the

conclusion of the hearing until the Secretary's determination.
See §137 .57 (D), App. 54a.

This totals up to at least 40 busi-

tf/) ~..f

ness days--as compared with the Williams Act's 10 day period.

~

pace of modern tender offers, a delay of 40 business

days must, I think, be counted as significant.
The second aspect of the Act's impact on commerce is

-------

its geographic scope.
out,

As the SG and Mite take pains to point

the Illinois Act purports to have a global effect.

The

Secretary, by his decision to hold hearing or prevent registra-

//!,

1tJ

4

>

tion,

blocks

the

offeror's

wherever they are located.

tender

offer

to

security holders

In this instance, Mite--a Delaware

corporation with offices in Connecticut--offered to buy Chicago
Rivet shares from its shareholders, 73% of whom reside located
outside of

Illinois.

(Fifty

six percent of

Chicago Rivet's

total number of shares are held outside of Illinois.)
33a.
~

App.'

There is nothing in the Illinois Act that requires that
of the shareholders reside in Illinois, because the appli-

cability of the act is premised solely on the target company's
connection with Illinois.

See note 2 supra. 5

I therefore con-

clude that both the magnitude and the geographic scope of the
Illinois Act's impact on interstate commerce are quite significant.
Against these factors must be balanced the justifications that Illinois asserts for

its statute.

These are two.

The first is the protection of Illinois investors.
at

25.

Illinois

argues

that

its

protection

Petr brief

supplements

the

Williams Act in an important way and that this interest should
be entitled to deference.
Noramlly such an argument would be entitled to consid-

5one way to analyze this case would be on an "as applied" basis, taking into account the number of shareholders actually located in Illinois in each case.
This case--where about 30% of
the shareholders reside in Illinois--then would be distinguished
from cases in which no--or all--shareholders resided in the
state. This factor presumably will become increasingly important
as the balancing between commercial impact and local regulatory
justification becomes closer.

erable weight, I think.

But in this context I believe the con-

clusion

the

developed

relevant--viz.,
tender
favor

offer
of

in

that

Congress

has

preemption
considered

analysis

more

See pages 8-9 supra.
added

between
This

offerors

and

is equivalent

regulations--like

target

is

extensive

regulation but has rejected this alternative

neutrality

benefits of

earlier

in

incumbents.

to saying

that the

Illinois' --are outweighed

by the resulting burdens on interstate commerce.

These burdens

are mainly those resulting from the insulation of inefficient
Illinois managers from the efficiency-maximizing force of exposure to the national tender offer market.

If you were persuad-

ed by the legislative history analysis in the preemption discussion, this should have implications here for the weight to
be attached to Illinois' asserted regulatory justification.
This suggested deference to a congressional judgment
does, of course,

have the potential of mixing the preemption

and the Commerce Clause analyses to a degree.
an

argument

ground.

for

deciding

the

case

only

on

Perhaps this is
the

preemption

But I have trouble seeing why such a national legisla-

tive weighing is not relevant in this Commerce Clause context.
After all, Commerce Clause judgments from this Court are always
subject to congressional revision.
al

legislative

judgments

should

strengthen, this Court's finding

It is not clear why nationbe

able

to excuse,

but

not

that a state action intrudes

to an impermissible degree on the national marketplace.
If you decide this congressional judgment is not rele-

vant

(or

not clear),

more difficult.

however,

the

balancing

in

this case is

Although I am less sure of this conclusion, I

tend to think the Illinois law still should be invalid.

The

national market of efficient managment seeking subsidiary acquisitions is an important one.
market

to

a

considerable--and

The Illinois law blocks this
potentially

unlimited--degree.

The majority of the shareholders that Illinois claims to protect do not live in Illinois.
law.

While

timelines

state

and

efforts

with

Nore need
with

closer

more

mandatory

~'

according to its

tightly

circumscribed

connections

with

the

State's investor population probably would pass muster, I think
that Illinois' effort reaches too far in this case.
Illinois' second justification for its statute is its
traditional power to regulate the "internal affairs" of Illinois

corporations.

I

have

a

difficult

time

separating

this

justification from the first--protection of Illinois investors.
Illinois analogizes its law to a "de facto proxy solicitation."
Petr brief at 26.

I do not understand how this is different

than regulation undertaken for
vestors.

the protection of Illinois in-

Whether traditional or not, it seems to me the proper

way to calculate the weight of this regulatory interest is according to the analysis in the preceeding paragraphs.
fore

conclude

that

the

Illinois

law's

substantial

I thereimpact on

interstate commerce outweighs the local regulatory justification that Illinois asserts.

III.

Conclusion

This case probably is moot.

-----------------------prosecution of

venting Illinois'

The DC's injunction pre-

its law--so long as Illinois

failed to obtain a stay or an appellate reversal of the order-should be held to

im~unize

quent state prosecution.

Mite from contemporaneous or subseBecause the DC order should protect

Mite in this regard, the parties no longer have a live dispute.
The decisions below should be vacated with instruction to dismiss the complaint as moot.
If the case is not moot, then Mite should win an affirmance on preemption grounds.

The Williams Act embodies pol-

icies both of neutrality between the contestants in tender offer battles and of sovereignty of investor (as opposed to agency)

investment

decision.

Y~t

~he

Illinoi$

advantage incumbent management and lessen
to a degree.
for required

act's

inve~tor

provisions
sovereignty

They do . this by providing for significant delay,
pre-com~encement

notification, and for the possi-

bility of state agency review of the substantive fairness . of
the proposed tender offer.

These provisions should be preempt-

ed because they obstruct achievement of the federal policies of
the Williams Act.
Although
ground for

the

Court

affirming the CA7,

need

not

reach

this

altenative

I believe that Mite also has a

winning argument on the Commerce Clause--although this reasoning is less certain because of the analytical vagaries in this
field.

But by my estimation, the Illinois statute has an un-

justifiably great impact on interstate commerce.

The Act ap-

plies to a substantial volume of interstate commerce.

It af-

fects this time-sensitive commerce by delaying it on a global
basis.

This significant impediment on interstate commerce out-

weighs Illinois' proffered justifications, which reduce to the
single value of investor protection.
be entitled to substantial weight.

Normally this value would
But,

in this instance, we

have a congressional judgment that such additional regulation
is not very important.
-which

seems

If deference is given to this judgment-

appropriate--Illinois'

justification

should

be

found to be outweighed by its statute's interstate commercial
impact.

If this judgment is not given weight, the question is

closer.

I

still come down,

Clause invalidity.

however, on the side of Commerce
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE W>< . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR.

RE:

February 2, 1982

No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear Thurgood:
I agree.

Sincerely,

/( ·1 I)
!/.i--L \_ lJ
I

j

Justice Marsha 11
cc: The Conference

I '

.iuprtutt <lfonrl of lltt ~tb ,jtws
..zudfington. ~· <If. 2ll&i'!~
CHAMBERS O F"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

February 3, 1982

Re:

No. 80-1188

Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear Thurgood:

l

While I agree generally with your circulating draft
opinion in this case, I have some difficulty reconciling the
last four sentences before the Roman numeral on page 11 with
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 147, which you cite on page
10, and with Lewis' treatment of that case in his presently
circulating draft opinion1 1n Murphy v. Hunt, No. 80-2165.
Up until the sentence beginning on the fifth lLne on page 11
of your draft, "Nor is there any risk that the question
whether the Illinois Act is constitutional will always
escape review by this Court, even in -cases involving other
cor
·
t t
impression that you are following
1nstein v. Bradfor
there must be a probability that
his p ~if will continue to have a
ontroversy with this
rticular defendant in order to come
wi
of repetition, yet evading review"
exception to the mootness principle. But beginning with the
sentence just referred to, I think that sentence and the
several that come after it could be read as expanding the
exception to cover situations where there is no probability
that these particular parties will again litigate, but where
the question at issue might nonetheless continue to "escape
review".
I, for one, have great reservations about such an
expansion of the "capable of repetition, yet . evading review"
exception to the mootness principle. I think it is
demonstrably contrary to Weinstein v. B dford, supra, and
if interpreted as I suggest woul a-req ~·
a different result
in Lewis' circulatio~
·n Murphy v. Hunt. If you mean no
actical observat' n, without
more than to make a
broadening the except1
the idea ay be unexceptionable,

-

2 -

but if this is the case I do think some of the language
should be changed to make it clear that this is what is
being done.
Sincerely,

/J../71.-tr
Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

~tt:pt"J.>tttt

<!Jmtrl Llf tltt> ~b ,~,hrll'll'

~agltittgflln.lB.
CHA M BERS OF

<!J. 2U,?J!;l

,

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVE N S

February 4, 1982

Re:

80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite

Dear Thurgood:
Your novel holding that a federal court has the
power to grant immunity from enforcement of a state
law even if the state law is valid is one that I cannot
accept.
In due course, I shall be writing in dissent .
Respectfully ,

.

/
I

I

J
Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

'
•

;

CHAMBERS 0 F

..JUSTICE BYRO N R . WHITE

Februa r y 8 , 19 82

Re:

80-1188 -Edgar v. Mite Corporation
and Mite Holdings, Inc.

Dear Thurgood,
I shall await John's dissent.
Sincerely yours,

I'

I

I

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
cpm

t

/~

-~

'

.

fo: The Cb1e! Justice
.Tustioe Brennan
.Tustioe Whit&
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
~Justice Rehnquiet
Justice stevens
Justice o•connor
From: Justice Marshall
Circulated:------:--

fi:.B 12 1982

Recirculated:-----------3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1188 · ·

JAMES EDGAR, APPELLANT v. MITE CORPORATION
AND MITE HOLDINGS, INC.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1982]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case arises out of an attempt by appellees, Mite Corporation and Mite Holdings, Inc. (referred to collectively as
Mite), to make a cash tender offer for another corporation,
Chicago Rivet & Machine Co. Before making the offer, appellees sought to enjoin the Secretary of State of Illinois from
enforcing the Illinois Business Take-Over Act (Illinois Act),
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.51 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1980)
The Illinois Act regulates purchases of stock in corporatio s
having substantial connections with Illinois. The U · ed
States District Court for the Northern District of mms
granted injunctive relief, holding that the Illinois A is preempted by the Williams Act amendments to the ecurities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78m(d)-(e , 78n(d)-(t),
and imposes an impermissible burden on inters te commerce
in violation of the Commerce Clause. App. o Juris. Statement (J.S. App.) 32a-41a. The United S tes Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirme . Mite Corp. v.
Dixon, 633 F. 2d 486 (1980). We no d probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1981). Beca e we conclude that the
case is moot, we now vacate the ·u
e of the Court of Ap1 emand the case to the
peals. The Court of Appeals
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I

Appellees are corporations organized under the laws of
Delaware with their principal executive offices in Connecticut. Mite Holdings, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Mite Corporation. Chicago Rivet & Machine Co. (Chicago
Rivet), the target of Mite's takeover bid, was a defendant in
the District Court, but did not participate in the proceedings
in the Court of Appeals, and is not a party here. Chicago
Rivet is· organized under the laws of Illinois. Although its
principal executive offices are located in that state, its principal place of business is in Pennsylvania.
Appellant James Edgar is the Secretary of State of Illinois,
and is charged with the administration and enforcement of
the Illinois Act. 1 Under the Act, any takeover offer for a
target corporation that has substantial connection with Illinois must be registered with the Secretary of State. 2 An
offer becomes registered 20 business days after the person
planning to make the offer files a registration statement with
1

When this litigation began, Alan C. Dixon was the Secretary of State of
Illinois.
2
Under the Illinois Act, a take-over offer is defined as:
"[an] offer to acquire or the acquisition of any equity security of a target
company, pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, if
after acquisition the offeror would be, directly or indirectly, a beneficial
owner of more than 5% of the class of the outstanding equity securities of
the target company which is the subject of the take-over offer."
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 1211/2, § 137.52-9 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
A target company is defined as:
"a corporation or other issuer of securities (1) of which 10% of the outstanding securities of the class of its equity securities which is the subject of a
take-over offer is held of record by securityholders located in this State
... , or (2) which meets any two of the following conditions:
(a) has its principal executive office in this State;
(b) is organized under the laws of this State;
(c) has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented in this State."
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.52-10 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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the Secretary. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.54(E) (Cum.
Supp. 1980). During this 20 day period, the Secretary may
call a hearing when he believes that it is necessary to protect
the stockholders of the target company. 3 If the Secretary
does conduct a hearing and concludes that the take-over offer
fails to provide full and fair disclosure to the target company
stockholders, or that it is otherwise inequitable, he may deny
the registration of the offer, or condition its registration upon
certain modifications. Ill Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.57
(Cum. Supp. 1980). The Secretary may issue cease and desist
orders and seek injunctions restraining violations of the Act.
In addition, he may file an action for civil remedies and penalties. Private parties may request injunctive relief and civil
remedies. Willful violations of the Act are subject to criminal prosecution. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 112. §§ 137.60,
137.62-137.65 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
The takeover battle began on January 19, 1979, when Mite
filed a Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, as required by § 14(d)(l) of the Williams Act, 15
U. S. C. § 78(n)(d)(1). In its filing, Mite stated that it
wished to make a cash tender offer for any and all shares of
Chicago Rivet common stock. It proposed to pay $28.00 per
share, which at that time represented a premium of approximately 15% over the market price. On the same day, Mite
commenced this litigation in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause. Mite also
asked for a temporary restraining order, and preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the Illinois Secretary
of State from enforcing the Illinois Act.
Chicago Rivet responded by initiating litigation in Pennsylvania, where it conducted most of its business. It sought to
enjoin Mite from proceeding with its proposed cash tender
3
The directors or stockholders of the target company may also request
such a hearing. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 1211/2, § 137.57 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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offer on the ground that Mite's offer violated the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. 70 Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 70,
§711.19 (Purdon Supp. 1978). 4 At the same time, Chicago
Rivet informed the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois that it was seeking relief in Pennsylvania, and that
it had no present intention of invoking the Illinois Act. The
Illinois Secretary of State told the District Court that it had
not yet decided whether Mite's offer should be exempt from
the Illinois Act. 5 Relying on these representations, the District Court adjourned proceedings on Mite's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief.
Chicago Rivet's efforts to obtain relief in Pennsylvania
proved unsuccessful. 6 As a result, both Chicago Rivet and
the Illinois Secretary of State took steps to invoke the Illinois
Act. On February 1, 1979, the Secretary of State notified
Mite of his intention to serve an order requiring Mite to
• Chicago Rivet filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair
County, Pa. It alleged that the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law
(Pennsylvania Act) applied to the tender offer because its principal place of
business was in Pennsylvania. Chicago Rivet also filed a complaint with
the Pennsylvania Securities Commission, requesting the Commission to
enforce the Pennsylvania Act against Mite. On January 23, 1979, Mite removed the Pennsylvania state court action to the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. It also filed a complaint
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Pennsylvania Act was unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting Chicago Rivet and the Pennsylvania
Securities Commission from enforcing the Act again~t Mite.
• The Illinois Act provides that the filing requirement does not apply
where the Secretary has determined that another jurisdiction has statutes
or rules which "are being applied and which afford protection to securityholders located in [Illinois] substantially equal to that afforded such
securityholders by this Act." Ill. Rev. Stat. , ch. 1211/2, § 137.53 (Cum.
Supp. 1980).
6
On January 31, 1979, the Pennsylvania Securities Commission decided
that it would not invoke the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. The
next day, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania denied Chicago Rivet's motion for a temporary restraining
order. See n. 4, supra.
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"cease and desist all further action to make a tender offer."
J.S. App. 36a. Chicago Rivet informed Mite that it would
file suit in Illinois state court to enjoin the proposed offer.
Mite immediately renewed its request for injunctive relief in
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. On
February 2, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining Dixon from enforcing the Illinois Act against
Mite's tender offer for Chicago Rivet. Record 16. 7 It determined that the Illinois Act was probably unconstitutional,
and that Mite would suffer irreparable injury if forced to
comply with the Act, because compliance would lead to substantial delay.
On February 5, 1979, Mite published its tender offer in the
Wall Street Journal. The offer was made to all Chicago Rivet's shareholders. On the same day, Chicago Rivet made an
offer for approximately 40% of its own shares at $30.00 per
share. On February 9, the District Court entered final judgment on Mite's application, declaring that the Illinois Act was
preempted by the Williams Act, and that it imposed an undue
burden on interstate commerce. J.S. App. 32a~1a. It also
permanently enjoined the Secretary of State from enforcing
the Illinois Act against Mite. J. S. App. 40a. 8
Several days after final judgment was entered, Mite and
Chicago Rivet reached an agreement under which both
tender offers were withdrawn and Mite was given 30 days to
examine the books and affairs of Chicago Rivet. Under the
agreement, Mite would either make a tender offer of $31 per
share on or before March 12, 1979, which Chicago Rivet
agreed not to oppose, or decide not to "acquire any stock or
7

The order was cast as a preliminary injunction rather than as a temporary restraining order to ensure that it would be immediately appealable.
App. I-9. However, neither the Secretary of State nor Chicago Rivet
sought interim relief in the Court of Appeals.
8
Although Mite requested that both the Secretary of State and Chicago
Rivet be enjoined from taking steps to enforce the Illinois Act, the permanent injunction applied only to the Secretary of State.

'
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assets of Rivet or make any offer to merge, consolidate or
otherwise acquire Rivet." App. to Brief for Appellees A.
On March 2, 1979, Mite announced its decision not to make a
tender offer.
The Secretary of State subsequently appealed the District
Court's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. In reaching this decision, it
expressly held that the controversy was not moot. 633 F. 2d
486, 490 (1980). As we explain below, that conclusion is
incorrect.
II
The jurisdiction of this Court depends on the existence of a
live controversy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1975);
SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403,
407 (1972). No such controversy exists here. Chicago
Rivet is not a party to these proceedings and has no interest
in the outcome of this case; Mite has agreed not to attempt
another takeover. Nor will the Secretary of State's position
be affected by resolution of the merits of this case. Even if
this Court were to hold that the Illinois Act is constitutional
and lift the permanent injunction that now restrains enforcement of the Act against Mite, there would be no basis for continued litigation by the Secretary. The Secretary states
that if the decision below were reversed, he would initiate enforcement proceedings against Mite in state court, seeking
civil and criminal penalties for its failure to comply with the
Illinois Act. However, a preliminary injunction was in effect
at the time the alleged violations occurred. This injunction
bars the Secretary from seeking either civil or criminal penalties for violations of the Act that occurred during that period.
The Secretary argues that the preliminary injunction
merely barred him from commencing an enforcement action
during the period the injunction was in effect. He suggests
that if this Court were to decide that the statute is constitutional and lift the permanent injunction, the State would be
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able to commence an action seeking penalties for any violations that occurred during the period the preliminary injunction was in effect. In other words, argues the Secretary, the
preliminary injunction only provided temporary security. It
enabled Mite to go forward with the tender offer-subject to
the risk that at some later stage, the constitutionality of the
statute would be upheld, and the state would commence enforcement proceedings.
Federal courts undoubtedly have the power to issue a preliminary injunction that restrains enforcement of a state statute, subject to the condition that if the statute is later found
to be valid, the state is free to seek penalties for violations
that occurred during the period the injunction was in effect.
Just as certainly, however, federal courts also have the
power to issue a preliminary injunction that offers permanent
protection from penalties for violations of the statute that
occurred during the period the injunction was in effect.
Determining whether a particular injunction provides temporary or permanent protection becomes a question of
interpretation.
In the ordinary case, unless the order contains specific language to the contrary, it should be presumed that an injunction secures permanent protection from penalties for violations that occurred during the period it was in effect; the
burden should be on the State to show that the injunction
provided only temporary security. A presumption in favor
of permanent protection is likely to reflect the intentions of
the court that granted the motion. In acting upon a request
for an injunction, it will recognize that short-term protection
is often only marginally better than no protection at all.
Parties seek to restrain the enforcement of a state statute,
not just because they want short-term protection, but because they desire permanent immunity for actions they take
in reliance on the injunction. If they are contemplating action that might violate a state statute, they will take little so-

'
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lace from temporary immunity-when they know that if they
decide to act, enforcement proceedings might be intitiated at
some later stage. 9
Here, the preliminary injunction does not expressly state
that it provides permanent immunity or violations o e Illinois Act that may occur during its e ective period. The injunction provides only that the Secretary of State is enjoined
from "issuing any cease and desist order or notice of hearing
or from otherwise invoking, applying, or enforcing the Illinois Business Take-Over Act" against Mite. Record 16.
However, the Secretary has failed to offer any reasons why
the presumption in favor of permanent protection should not
be applied here. In this context, as the District Court must
have recognized, permanent protection was needed. Mite
sought an injunction, not just because it desired protection
from enforcement actions during the period it was actually
making the tender offer, but also because it desired protection from such actions in the future. The Act provides for
Mite would have
substantial civil and criminal penalties.
been reluctant to go forward with its offer,which entailed
considerable expense, if there were some risk that it would
be penalized later. Indeed, in the Schedule 14D-1 filed with
the SEC, Mite expressly stated that it would not commence
the tender offer unless it obtained injunctive relief. It also
9
In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974), the Court indicated that,
at least in cases involving constitutionally protected activity, the function
of a preliminary injunction against a state criminal statute is to allow the
party obtaining the injunction to act without fear of eventual prosecution.
The Court suggested that injunctive relief would ordinarily be appropriate
where the applicant for relief is situated "between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believes to
be constitutionally protected acitivity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed
in a criminal proceeding." !d., at 462. See also Hygrade Provision Co. v.
Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 500 (1925); Terrace v. Thompson , 263 U. S. 197,
216 (1923); Salem Inn, Inc . v. Frank, 501 F. 2d 18, 21 (CA2 1974), aff'd in
relevant part sub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975).
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reserved the right to withdraw its offer if injunctive relief
were initially granted, but later withdrawn. See Record,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14. 10
Interpreting the injunction to provide permanent protection also ensures that Mite will not be penalized for acting in
reliance on the injunction. 11 Mite went forward with the
tender offer, reasonably believing that the District Court's
order provided complete immunity. Under the circumstances, it would be improper to permit the State to penalize
action taken while the injunction was in effect. In the past, \
this Court has recognized that reasonable reliance on judicial
pronouncements may constitute a valid defense to criminal
prosecution. See, e. g., Marks v. United States, 430 U. S.
188 (1977). 12

In addition to arguing that the preliminary injunction
should be interpreted to provide only temporary protection
from a state enforcement action, the Secretary argues that
We also find it significant that the District Court's final order granting
a permanent injunction declares that ~he Illinois Act is "null and void and of
no force and effect." J.S. App. 41a. A reasonable construction of the
order granting a preliminary injunction is that it was also intended to render the act "null and void" while the injunction was in effect.
11
It is relevant to note that, although Mite sought injunctive relief prior
to engaging in any action that could subject it to civil or criminal penalties,
the state never sought a stay of the District Court's injunction either in
that court or in the Court of Appeals, and never expressed an intent to do
10

(_~_)-~Marks,

a conviction for transporting obscene materials was overturned, where the materials were not obscene at time of transportation,
but were rendered obscene at time of trial by intervening decision of this
Court. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 569--571 (1965) (conviction for illegal picketing reversed where defendant had relied on permission from police officer); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 437-439·(1959) (conviction for refusal to testify before state commission reversed because
witness had relied on opinion of commission chairman that he was privileged to remain silent); United States v. Mancuso, 139 F. 2d 90 (CA3 1943)
(defendant could not be held liable for ignoring induction notices issued
while ex parte order staying induction was in effect).

'
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resolution of the mootness issue in this case should be controlled by Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S.
173 (1979). In that case, Great Western announced its intention to make a tender offer to purchase stock in another corporation. Idaho officials responsible for administering an
Idaho statute governing corporate takeovers, see Idaho
Code, §§ 30--1500 et seq, objected to the offer and delayed its
effective date. Great Western brought an action in Federal
District Court, seeking a declaration that the Idaho takeover
law was unconstitutional, and an injunction restraining Idaho
officials from enforcing the statute. The District Court
granted injunctive relief that enabled Great Western to complete the acquisition. This Court, in reviewing the case,
held that the controversy was not moot. "[T]he question
whether Great Western has violated Idaho's statute will remain open unless and until the District Court's judgment is
finally affirmed." /d., at 478. 13
Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. is easily distinguishable from this case. Unlike Mite, Great Western took actions that might have violated the state takeover statute before it obtained injunctive relief. If this Court had decided
that the Idaho statute was valid, Idaho officials might have
been able to seek penalties for those pre-injunction violations.14 Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. can also be
distinguished on the ground that the takeover offer in that
case was successful. If the Idaho statute had been found to
be valid, then Idaho officials would have been able to seek a
recission of the takeover. 15 Here, since the acquisition was
13
The Court did not reach the question whether the Idaho statute was
unconstitutional. It concluded that the action should have been dismissed
on grounds of improper venue.
14
See Idaho Code, ch. 5B, §§ 30-1502-1504, 1510.
'" See Idaho Code, ch. 5B, §§ 30-1514 (allowing state to institute action )
for recission). The Illinois Act also empowers the state to seek a court
order rescinding sales that are unlawful under the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch.
121 1/2, § 137.60 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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never completed, Illinois officials could not seek recission. 16
Finally, this case does not fall within the exception to the
mootness doctrine for cases that "are capable of repetition,
yet evading review." Unless a class action is involved, that
exception applies only when the challenged action is too short
to be fully litigated before its cessation, and when there is a
reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that
the same complaining party will be subject to the same action
in the future. Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 187 (1979); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975). The second requirement has
not been satisfied here. Mite has agreed not to renew its efforts to acquire Chicago Rivet. Thus, unless Mite breaches
its agreement, 17 these particular corporations will never
again become involved in a dispute over the constitutionality
of the Illinois Act. Nor will the state ever again have occasion to prevent Mite from making a takeover offer for Chicago Rivet. 18
There is no danger that the question whether the Illinois
Act is constitutional will always escape review by this Court,
16
It is true that a recission action would have been predicated on acts
that were taken under cover of the preliminary injunction. However, injunctions should ordinarily be interpreted only as providing permanent
protection from penalties. The state should be barred from penalizing the
offeror for acts that took place during the period the injunction was in effect. However, if a court determines that the state statute is valid, the
state should be free to provide a remedy for the continuing effects of acts
that violated the statute. In particular, a state should be permitted to dismantle a successful acquisition that violated a valid statute.
17
The possibility that Mite will breach its agreement does not bring this
case within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception.
The likelihood that such a breach will occur is relatively small. The· exception applies only when there is a reasonable expectation that the same action will occur in the future.
18
It is true that Mite may attempt to acquire some corporation other than
Chicago Rivet, and that Illinois may seek to prevent such an acquisition.
It is quite possible, however, that the constitutionality of the Illinois Act
would be reviewable at that time. See text accompanying note 19 infra.

'
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even in cases involving other corporations. The offeror corporation might fail to obtain an injunction before commencing
the tender offer, so that its actions prior to the injunction
could be the subject of an enforcement proceeding. 19 Even if
injunctive relief conferring complete immunity were obtained
before the offeror commenced its takeover bid, the tender offer might not end as it did here, with an agreement between
teh offeror and the target that there would be no further
takeover attempt. If the takeover efforts might be renewed, then a live controversy between the offeror and the
target would remain. A live controversy might also remain
if the takeover offer were successful. In such a case, if the
statute were later found to be constitutional, then the state
~ be able to seek a recission of the acquisition.

III
The parties to this appeal have no adversary interest in the
resolution of the merits of this controversy. Because the
case is moot, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals should remand the case to the
District Court with instructions to dismiss.

The constitutionality of the Act might also be reviewable if the court
grants an injunction subject to the condition that if the state is later found
to be valid, the state may seek peanlties for any violations that took place
during the period the injunction was in effect.
19
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JAMES EDGAR, APPELLANT v. MITE CORPORATION
AND MITE HOLDINGS, INC.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June-,

1982]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the Illinois Business TakeOver Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.51, et seq. (Supp.
1980), is unconstitutional under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution.
I
Appellee MITE Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, MITE Holdings, Inc., are corporations organized under
the laws of Delaware with their principal executive offices in
Connecticut. Appellant James Edgar is the Secretary of
State of Illinois and is charged with the administration and
enforcement of the Illinois Act. Under the Illinois Act any
takeover offer 1 for the shares of a corporation must be registered with the Secretary of State if 10% of the class of equity

'The Illino's Act defines "take-over offer" as "the offer to acquire or the
acquisition of any equity security of a target company pursuant to a tender
offer.... " Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.52-9 (Supp. 1980). "A
tender offer has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares
for sale at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender
Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250,
1251 (1973). The terms "tender offer" and "takeover offer" are often used
interchangeably.
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securities subject to the offer are owned by shareholders residing in Illinois or if any two of the following conditions are
met: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under the laws of Illinois, or has at least
10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented
within the state. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.52-9 and
10 (Supp. 1980). An offer becomes registered 20 days after a
registration statement is filed with the Secretary unless the
Secretary calls a hearing. Id., at § 137.54(E). The Secretary may call a hearing at any time during the 20-day waiting
period to adjudicate the substantive fairness of the offer if he
believes it is necessary to protect the shareholders of the target company, and a hearing must be held if requested by a
majority of a target company's outside directors or by Illinois
shareholders who own 10% of the class of securities subject to
the offer. !d., at§ 137.57(A). If the Secretary does hold a
hearing, he is directed by the statute to deny registration to a
tender offer if he finds that it "fails to provide full and fair
disclosure to the offerees of all material information concerning the take-over, or that the take-over offer is inequitable or
would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the
offerees .... " !d., at§ 137.57.E.
On January 19, 1979, MITE initiated a cash tender offer for
all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine Co., a
publicly held Illinois corporation, by filing a Schedule 14D-1
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to
comply with the Williams Act. 2 The Schedule 14D-1 indi' The Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454, et seq., codified at 15 U. S. C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), added new sections 13(d), 13(e) and 14(d)-(f)

to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 14(d)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act requires an offeror seeking to acquire more than five percent of any class of equity security by means of a tender offer to first file a
Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Schedule requires disclosure of the source of funds used to purchase the
target shares, past transctions with the target company, and other material financial information about the offeror. In addition, the offeror must
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cated that MITE was willing to pay $28.00 per share for any
and all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet, a premium of approximately $4.00 over the then-prevailing market price.
MITE did not comply with the Illinois Act, however, and
commenced this litigation on the same day by filing an action
in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. The complaint asked for a declaratory judgment
that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and
violated the Commerce Clause. In addition, MITE sought a
temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent
injunctions prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from
enforcing the Illinois Act.
Chicago Rivet responded three days later by bringing suit
in Pennsylvania, where it conducted most of its business,
seeking to enjoin MITE from proceeding with its proposed
tender offer on the ground that the offer violated the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, 70 Pa. Stat. Ann., Title
70, § 711.19 (Supp. 1978). After MITE's efforts to obtain relief in Pennsylvania proved unsuccessful, 3 both Chicago
disclose any antitrust or other legal problems which might result from the
success of the offer. 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981). Section 14(d)(1) requires the offeror to publish or send a statement of the relevant facts contained in the Schedule 14D-1 to the shareholders of the target company.
In addition, § 13(d), also added by the Williams Act, requires a purchaser
of any equity security registered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 781, to file a schedule 13D with the Commission
within ten days after its purchases have exceeded five percent of the outstanding shares of the security. Schedule 13D requires essentially the
same disclosures as required by Schedule 14D-1. Compare 17 CFR
§ 240.13d-101 (1981) with 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981).
3
In addition to filing suit in state court, Chicago Rivet filed a complaint
with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission requesting the Commission
to enforce the Pennsylvania Act against MITE. On January 31, 1979 the
Pennsylvania Securities Commission decided that it would not invoke the
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. The next day, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to which MITE
had removed the state court action, denied Chicago Rivet's motion for a
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Rivet and the Illinois Secretary of State took steps to invoke
the Illinois Act. On February 1, 1979, the Secretary of
State notified MITE that he intended to issue an order requiring it to cease and desist further efforts to make a tender
offer for Chicago Rivet. On February 2, 1979 Chicago Rivet
notified MITE by letter that it would file suit in Illinois state
court to enjoin the proposed tender offer. MITE renewed
its request for injunctive relief in the District Court and on
February 2 the District Court issued a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois
Act against MITE's tender offer for Chicago Rivet.
MITE then published its tender offer in the February 5
edition of the Wall Street Journal. The offer was made to all
shareholders of Chicago Rivet residing throughout the
United States. The outstanding stock was worth over $23
million at the offering price. On the same day Chicago Rivet
made an offer for approximately 40% of its own shares at
$30.00 per share. 4 The District Court entered final judgment on February 9, declaring that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and that it violated the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the District Court permanently
enjoined enforcement of the Illinois statute against MITE.
Shortly after final judgment was entered, MITE and Chicago
Rivet entered into an agreement whereby both tender offers
were withdrawn and MITE was given 30 days to examine the
books and records of Chicago Rivet. Under the agreement
MITE was either to make a tender offer of $31.00 per share
before March 12, 1979, which Chicago Rivet agreed not to oppose, or decide not to acquire Chicago Rivet's share or assets. App. to Brief for Appellees 1a-4a. On March 2, 1979,
MITE announced its decision not to make a tender offer.
temporary restraining order.
' Chicago Rivet's offer for its own shares was exempt from the requirements of the Illinois Act pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. , ch. 121 1/2,
§ 137.52-9(4) (Supp. 1980).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed sub nom. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F. 2d 486
(1980). It agreed with the District Court that several provisions of the Illinois Act are preempted by the Williams Act
and that the Illinois Act unduly burdens interstate commerce
in violation of the Commerce Clause. We noted probable jurisdiction, 451 U. S. 968 (1981), and now affirm.

II
The Court of Appeals specifically found that this case was
not moot, 633 F. 2d, at 490, reasoning that because the Secretary has indicated he intends to enforce the Act against
MITE, a reversal of the judgment of the District Court would
expose MITE to civil and criminal liability • for making the
February 5, 1979 offer in violation of the Illinois Act. We
agree. It is urged that the preliminary injunction issued by
the District Court is a complete defense to civil or criminal
penalties. While that is not a frivolous question by any
means, it is an issue to be decided when and if the Secretary
of State initiates an action. That action would be foreclosed
if we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act is
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the case is not moot.
III
We first address the holding that the Illinois Takeover Act
is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. We note at
the outset that in passing the Williams Act, which is an
amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Congress did not also amend § 28(a) of the 1934 Act. 6 In pertinent part, § 28(a) provides as follows:
5
The Secretary of State may bring an action for civil penalties for violations of the Illinois Act., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.65 (Supp. 1980),
and a person who willfully violates the Act is subject to criminal prosecution. Id. , at § 137.63.
6
There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress was
aware of state takeover laws when it enacted the Williams Act. When the
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"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of
the Securities Commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any state over any security or
any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder."
Thus Congress did not explicitly prohibit states from regulating takeovers; it left the determination whether the Illinois
statute conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts. Of
course, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually
conflicts with a valid federal statute; and,
"[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility
.. . ,'Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state 'law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., supra, at 526, 540-541. Accord, De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 363 (2976)." Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 158 (1978).
Our inquiry is further narrowed in this case since there is no
contention that it would be impossible to comply with both
the provisions of the Williams Act and the more burdensome
requirements of the Illinois law. The issue thus is, as it was
in the Court of Appeals, whether the Illinois Act frustrates
the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way.
The Williams Act, passed in 1968, was the congressional
Williams Act was enacted in 1968, only Virginia had a takeover statute.
The Virginia statute, Va. Code§ 131-528, became effective March 5, 1968;
the Williams Act was enacted several months later on July 19, 1968.
Takeover statutes are now in effect in 37 states. Sargent, On the Validity
of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42
Ohio St. L. J. 689, 690 n. 7 (1981).
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response to the increased use of cash tender offers in corporate acquisitions, a device that had "removed a substantial
number of corporate control contests from the reach of the
exsiting disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws." Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U. S. 1, 22
(1977). The Williams Act filled this regulatory gap. The
Act imposes several requirements. First, it requires that
upon the commencement of the tender offer, the offeror file
with the SEC, publish or send to the shareholders of the target company, and furnish to the target company detailed information about the offer. 15 U. S. C. § 78(n)(d)(1), 17 CFR
§ 240.24d-3 (1981). The offeror must disclose information
about its background and identity; the source of the funds to
be used in making the purchase; the purpose of the purchase,
including any plans to liquidate the company or make major
changes in its corporate structure; and the extent of the
offeror's holdings in the target company. 15 U. S. C.
§ 78m(d)(1), 17 CFR § 240.13d-1 (1981). See also note 2,
supra. Second, stockholders who tender their shares may
withdraw them during the first seven days of a tender offer
and if the offeror has not yet purchased their shares, at any
time after sixty days from the commencement of the offer.
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5). 7 Third, all shares tendered must be
purchased for the same price; if an offering price is increased,
those who have already tendered receive the benefit of the
increase. 15 U.S. C. §78n(d)(7). 8
7

The seven-day withdrawal period contained in the Williams Act has
been extended to 15 business days by the Commission. 17 CFR
§ 240.14d-7(a)(1).
8
The Williams Act also provides that when the number of shares tendered exceeds the number of shares sought in the offer, those shares tendered during the first 10 days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata
basis. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(6). The Act also contains a general antifraud
provision, 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e), which has been interpreted to require disclosure of material information known to the offeror even if disclosure was
not otherwise required. See, e. g. Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Welling-
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There is no question that in imposing these requirements,
Congress intended to protect investors. Piper v. ChrisCraft Industries, supra, at 35; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 58 (1975); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1967) ("Senate Report"). But it is also crystal
clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor
was to avoid favoring of either management or the takeover
bidder. As we noted in Piper, the disclosure provisions
originally embodied in S.2731 "were avowedly pro-management in the target company's efforts to defeat takeover
bids." 430 U. S. , at 30. But Congress became convinced
"that takeover bids should not be discouraged because they
serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but
inefficient management." Senate Report at 3. 9 It also became apparent that entrenched management was often successful in defeating takeover attempts. As the legislation
evolved, therefore, Congress disclaimed any "intention to
provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover
bids ... " Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58,
and expressly embraced a policy of neutrality. As Senator
Williams explained, "We have taken extreme care to avoid
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of
the persons making the takeover bids." 113 Cong. Rec.
24664 (1967). This policy of "evenhandedness", Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries, supra, at 31, represented a conviction that neither side in the contest should be extended additional advantages vis-a-vis the investor, who if furnished
with adequate information would be in a position to make his
own informed choice. We, therefore, agree with the Court
of Appeals that Congress sought to protect the investor not
ton Associates, 483 F. 2d 247, 250 (CA 2 1973).
9
Congress also did not want to deny shareholders "the opportunities
which result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock of a given
company", namely the opportunity to sell shares for a premium over their
market price. 113 Cong. Rec. 24665 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
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only by furnishing him with the necessary information but
also by withholding from management or the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice. 633 F. 2d, at 496.
To implement this policy of investor protection while maintaining the balance between management and the bidder,
Congress required the latter to file with the Commission and
furnish the company and the investor with all information adequate to the occasion. With that filing, the offer could go
forward, stock could be tendered and purchased, but a stockholder was free within a specified time to withdraw his tendered shares. He was also protected if the offer was increased. Looking at this history as a whole, it appears to us,
as it did to the Court of Appeals, that Congress intended to
strike a balance between the investor, management and the
takeover bidder. The bidder was to furnish the investor and
the target company with adequate information but there was
no "intention to do ... more than give incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its position."
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58. Once that
opportunity was extended, Congress anticipated that the investor, if he so chose, and the takeover bidder should be free
to move forward within the time-frame provided by
Congress.
IV
The Court of Appeals identified three provisions of the Illinois Act that upset the careful balance struck by Congress
and which therefore stand as obstacles to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in all essential respects.
A

The Illinois Act requires a tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to make a
tender offer and the material terms of the offer twenty busi-
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ness days before the offer becomes effective. Ill. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 121 112, §§ 137.54E, 137.54B (Supp. 1980.) During that
time, the offeror may not communicate its offer to the shareholders, id., at § 137.54A. Meanwhile, the target company
is free to disseminate information to its shareholders concerning the impending offer. The contrast with the Williams Act
is apparent. Under that Act, there is no pre-commencement
notification requirement; the critical date is the date a tender
offer is "first published or sent or given to security holders."
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(l). See also 17 CFR § 240.14d-2 (1981).
We agree with with the Court of Appeals that by providing
the target company with additional time within which to take
steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notification
provisions furnish incumbent management with a powerful
tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the
stockholders who will not have an offer before them during
this period. 10 These consequences are precisely what Congress determined should be avoided, and for this reason, the
precommencement notification provision frustrates the objectives of the Williams Act.
It is important to note in this respect that in the course of
· events leading to the adoption of the Williams Act, Congress
several times refused to impose a precommencement disclosure requirement. In October 1965, Senator Williams introduced S.2731, a bill which would have required a bidder to
notify the target company and file a public statement with
the Securities and Exchange Commission at least 20 days before commencement of a cash tender offer for more than five
per cent of a class of the target company's securities. 111
Cong. Rec. 28259 (1965). The Commission commented on
the bill and stated that "the requirement of a 20-day advance
notice to the issuer and the Commission is unnecessary for
the protection of security holders ... " 112 Cong. Rec.
10

See note 11 and accompanying text, infra.
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190005 (1966). Senator Williams introduced a new bill in
1967, S.510, which provided for a confidential filing by the
tender offeror with the Commission five days prior to the
commencement of the offer. S.510 was enacted as the Williams Act after elimination of the advance disclosure requirement. As the Senate Report explained,
"At the hearings it was urged that this prior review was
not necessary and in some cases might delay the offer
when time was of the essence. In view of the authority
and responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission to take appropriate action in the event that inadequate or misleading information is disseminated to the
public to solicit acceptance of a tender offer, the bill as
approved by the committee requires only that the statement be on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission at the time the tender offer is first made to the
public." Senate Report at 4.
Congress rejected another pre-commencement notification
proposal during deliberations on the 1970 amendments to the
Williams Act. 11
H. R. 4285, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The bill was not reported out
of the subcommittee. Instead, the Senate amendments to the Williams
Act, which did not contain pre-commencement notification provisions,
were adopted. Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated detailed
rules governing the conduct of tender offers. Rule 14d-2(b), 17 CFR
§ 240.14d-2(b) (1981), requires that a tender offeror make its offer effective
within five days of publicly announcing the material terms of the offer by
disseminating specified information to shareholders and filing the requisite
documents with the Commission. Otherwise the offeror must announce
that it is withdrawing its offer. The events in this litigation took place
prior to the effective date of Rule 14d-2(b), and because Rule 14d-2(b) operates prospectively only, see 44 Fed. Reg. 70326 (1979), it is not at issue
in this case.
11
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B

For similar reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act frustrate the
congressional purpose by introducing extended delay into the
tender offer process. The Illinois Act allows the Secretary
of State to call a hearing with respect to any tender offer subject to the Act, and the offer may not proceed until the hearing is completed. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, §§ 137.57A and
B. (Supp. 1980) The Secretary may call a hearing at any
time prior to the commencement of the offer, and there is no
deadline for the completion of the hearing.
/d., at
§§ 137.57C and D. Although the Secretary is to render a decision within 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, that
period may be extended without limitation. Not only does
the Secretary of State have the power to delay a tender offer
indefinitely, but incumbent management may also use the
hearing provisions of the Illinois Act to delay a tender offer.
The Secretary is required to call a hearing if requested to do
so by, among other persons, those who are located in Illinois
"as determined by post office address as shown on the
records of the target company and who hold of record or beneficially, or both, at least 10% of the outstanding shares of
any class of equity securities which is the subject of the takeover offer." /d., at § 137.57.A. Since incumbent management in many cases will control, either directly or indirectly,
10% of the target company's shares, this provision allows
management to delay the commencement of an offer by insisting on a hearing. As the Court of Appeals observed,
these provisions potentially afford management a "powerful
weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover." 633 F. 2d, at
494. 12 In enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself "recogDelay has been characterized as "the most potent weapon in a tender
offer fight." Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 Cornell L. Q. 213, 238 (1977). See also
Wachtel!, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. L. 1433,
12
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nized that delay can seriously impede a tender offer" and
sought to avoid it. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F. 2d 1256, 1277 (CA5 1978); Senate Report at 4. 13
Congress reemphasized the consequences of delay when it
enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 15 U. S. C. 12, et seq.
"[I]t is clear that this short waiting period [the ten-day
period for proration provided for by § 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act, which applies only after a tender
offer is commenced] was founded on congressional concern that a longer delay might unduly favor the target
firm's incumbent management, and permit them to frustrate many pro-competitive cash tenders. This ten-day
waiting period thus underscores the basic purpose of the
Williams Act-to maintain a neutral policy towards cash
tender offers, by avoiding lengthy delays that might discourage their chances for success." H. R. Rep. No.
94-1373, 94th Gong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976). 14
1437-1442 (1977); Wilner and Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover
Laws and Their Constitutionality, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 9--10 (1976).

According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, delay enables
a target company to:
"(1) repurchase its own securities;
"(2) announce dividend increases or stock splits;
"(3) issue additional shares of stock;
"(4) acquire other companies to produce an antitrust violation should the
tender offer succeed;
"(5) arrange a defensive merger;
"(6) enter into restrictive loan agreements,
"(7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer." Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae 10, n. 8.
14
Representative Rodino set out the consequences of delay in greater
detail when he described the relationship between the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act and the Williams Act:
"In the case of cash tender offers, more so than in other mergers, the equities include time and the danger of undue delay. This bill in no way intends to repeal or reverse the congresional purpose underlying the 1968
13
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As we have said, Congress anticipated investors and the
takeover offeror be free to go forward without unreasonable
delay. The potential for delay provided by the hearing provisions upset the balance struck by Congress by favoring
management at the expense of stockholders. We therefore
agree with the Court of Appeals that these hearing provisions conflict with the Williams Act.

c
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Illinois Act is
pre-empted by the Williams Act insofar as it allows the Secretary of State of Illinois to pass on the substantive fairness
of a tender offer. Under § 137.57E of the Illinois law, the
Secretary is required to deny registration of a takeover offer
if he finds that the offer "fails to provide full and fair disclosure to the offerees . . . or that the take-over offer is inequitable . . . . " (Emphasis added). '5 The Court of Appeals understood the Williams Act and its legislative history to
indicate that Congress intended for investors to be free to
Williams Act, or the 1970 amendments to that act. . . . Lengthier delays
will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer, by abolishing
cumulative voting, arranging a speedy defense merger, quickly incorporating in a State with an antitakeover statute or negotiating costly lifetime
employment contracts for incumbent man<_£ement. And the longer the
waiting period, the more the target's stock may be bid up in the market,
making the offer more costly-and less successful. Should this happen, it
will mean that shareholders of the target firm will be effectively deprived
of the choice that cash tenders give to them: Either accept the offer and
thereby gain the tendered premium, or reject the offer. Generally, the
courts have construed the Williams Act so as to maintain these two options
for the target company's shareholders, and the House conferees contemplate that the courts will continue to do so. " 122 Cong. Rec. 30877 (1976).
16
Appellant argues that the Illinois Act does not permit him to ajudicate
the substantive fairness of a tender offer. Brief for Appellant 21-22. On
this state-law issue, however, we follow the view of the Court of Appeals
that § 137.57.E allows the Secretary of State "to pass upon the substantive
fairness of a tender offer.. . ." 633 F. 2d, at 493.
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make their own decisions. We agree. Both the House and
Senate Reports observed that the Act was designed to "make
the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair
opportunity to make their decision." H. R. Rep. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968); Senate Report at 3. Thus, as
the Court of Appeals said, "the state thus offers investor protection at the expense of investor autonomy-an approach
quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress." 633 F. 2d,
at 494.

v
The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have
Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several
states." U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "[A]t least since
Cooley v. Board ofWardens, 12 How. 299 (1852), it has been
clear that 'the Commerce Clause. . . . even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the
power of the States."' Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366, 370-371 (1976), quoting Freeman v.
Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). See also Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 35 (1980). Not
every exercise of state power with some impact on interstate
commerce is invalid. A state statute must be upheld if it
"regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public intere t, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental ... unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 141 (1970), citing
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443 (1960).
The Commerce Clause, however, permits only incidental
regulation of interstate commerce by the states; direct regulation is prohibited. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268
U. S. 189, 199 (1925). See also, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
supra, at 142. The Illinois Act violates these principles for
two reasons. First, it directly regulates and prevents, unless its terms are satisfied, interstate tender offers which in \

I
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turn would generate interstate transactions. Second, the f
burden the Act imposes on interstate commerce is excessive
in light of the local interests the Act purports to further.
A

States have traditionally regulated intrastate securities
transactions, 16 and this Court has upheld the authority of
states to enact "blue-sky" laws against Commerce Clause
challenges on several occasions. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U. S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards
Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co.,
242 U. S. 568 (1917). The Court's rationale for upholding
the state laws was that the laws only regulated transactions
occurring within the regulated states. "The provisions of
the law . . . apply to dispositions of securities within the
State and while information of those issued in other States
and foreign countries is required to be filed . . . they are only
affected by the requirement of a license of one who deals with
them within the State. . . . Such regulations affect interstate commerce in securities only incidentally." Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., supra, at 557-558 (cites omitted). Congress
has also recognized the validity of such laws governing intrastate securities transactions in § 28a of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a), a provision "designed to
save state blue-sky laws from preemption." Leroy v. Great
Western Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182, n. 13 (1979).
The Illinois Act differs substantially from state blue-sky
laws in that it directly regulates transactions which take
place across state lines, even if wholly outside the State of
Illinois. A tender offer for securities of a publicly-held organization is ordinarily communicated by the use of the mails or \
other means of interstate commerce to shareholders across
For example, the Illinois Blue Sky law, Ill. Rev . Stat. ch. 121 112,
§ 137.1, et seq. (Supp. 1980), provides that securities subject to the law
must be registered "prior to sale in this State .. ." !d. , at§ 137. 5.
16
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the country and abroad. Securities are tendered and transactions closed by similar means. Thus, in this case, Mite
Corporation, the tender offeror, is a Delaware corporation
with principal offices in Connecticut. Chicago Rivet is a
publicly-held Illinois corporation with shareholders scattered
around the country, 27% of whom live in Illinois. Mite's
offer to Chicago Rivet's shareholders, including those in Illinois, necessarily employed interstate facilities in communicating its offer, which, if accepted, would result in transactions occurring across state lines. These transactions would
themselves be interstate commerce. Yet the Illinois law,
unless complied with, sought to prevent Mite from making its
offer and concluding interstate transactions not only with
Chicago Rivet's stockholders living in Illinois, but also with
those living in other states and having no connection with Illinois. Indeed, the Illinois law on its face would apply even if
not a single one of Chicago Rivet's shareholders were a resident of Illinois, since the Act applies to every tender offer for
a corporation meeting two of the following conditions: the
corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under Illinois laws, or has at least 10% of its stated
capital and paid-in surplus represented in Illinois. Ill. Rev.
Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.52-10.(2) (Supp. 1980). Thus the Act
could be applied to regulate a tender offer which would not
affect a single Illinois shareholder.
It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct
restraint on interstate commerce and that it has a sweeping
extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, if Illinois may impose
such regulations, so may other states; and interstate commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers
would be thoroughly stifled. In Shafer v. Farmers Grain
Co., supra, at 199, the Court held that "a state statute which
by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens
. . . [interstate] commerce is a prohibited regulation and
invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted."
See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794,
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806 (1976). The Commerce Clause also precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly
outside of the state's borders, whether or not the commerce
has effects within the state. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 775 (1945), the Court struck down on
Commerce Clause grounds a state law where the "practical
effect of such regulation is to control ... [conduct] beyond
the boundaries of the state .... " The limits on a state's
power to enact substantive legislation are similar to the limits on the jurisdiction of state courts. In either case, "any
attempt 'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over
persons or property would offend sister States and exceed
the inherent limits of the State's power." Shafer v. Heitner,
433 u. s. 186, 197 (1977).
Because the Illinois Act purports to regulate directly and
to interdict interstate commerce, including commerce wholly
outside the state, it must be held invalid as were the laws at
issue in Shafer and Southern Pacific.
B

The Illinois Act is also unconstitutional under the test of
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S., at 142, for even when
a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the
burden imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in
relation to the local interests served by the statute. The
most obvious burden the Illinois Act imposes on interstate
commerce arises from the statute's previously-described nationwide reach which purports to give Illinois the power to
determine whether a tender offer may proceed anywhere.
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to
block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a
premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their
highest-valued use, a process which can improve efficiency
and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer
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mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well
so that stock prices remain high is reduced.
See
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1161, 117~1174 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 5, 27-28, 45
(1978); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1373, 94th Gong., 2d Sess. 12
(1976).
Appellant claims the Illinois Act furthers two legitimate
local interests. He argues that Illinois seeks to protect resident security holders and that the Act merely regulates the
internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that these asserted interests are insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois imposes on interstate commerce.
While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state
objective, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
non-resident shareholders. Insofar as the Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed
in the balance to sustain the law. We note, furthermore,
that the Act completely exempts from coverage a corporation's acquisition of its own shares. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121
112, § 137.52.09(4). Thus Chicago Rivet was able to make a
competing tender offer for its own stock without complying
with the Illinois Act, leaving Chicago Rivet's shareholders to
depend only on the protections afforded them by federal securities law, protections which Illinois views as inadequate to
protect investors in other contexts. This distinction is at
variance with Illinois' asserted legislative purpose, and tends
to undermine appellant's justification for the burdens the
statute imposes on interstate commerce.
We are also unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially
enhances the shareholders' position. The Illinois Act seeks
to protect shareholders of a company subject to a tender offer
by requiring disclosures regarding the offer, assuring that
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shareholders have adequate time to decide whether to tender
their shares, and according shareholders withdrawal, proration and equal consideration rights. However, the Williams
Act provides these same substantive protections, compare
Ill. Rev. Ann. Stat., ch. 121112, §§ 137.59.C, D, and E (Supp.
1980) (withdrawal, proration, and equal consideration rights)
with 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5), (6) and (7) and 17 CFR
§ 240.14d-7 (same). As the Court of Appeals noted, the disclosures required by the Illinois Act which go beyond those
mandated by the Williams Act and the regulations pursuant
to it may not substantially enhance the shareholders' ability
to make informed decisions. 633 F. 2d, at 500. It also was
of the view that the possible benefits of the potential delays
required by the Act may be outweighed by the increased risk
that the tender offer will fail due to defensive tactics employed by incumbent management. We are unprepared to
disagree with the Court of Appeals in these respects, and
conclude that the protections the Illinois Act affords resident
security holders are, for the most part, speculative.
Appellant also contends that Illinois has an interest in
regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated
under its laws. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of
laws principle which recognizes that only one state should
have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be
faced with conflicting demands. See Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws, § 302, Comment b at 307-308 (1971).
That doctrine is of little use to the state in this context.
Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders
to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal
affairs of the target company. Great Western United Corp.
v. Kidwell, 577 F. 2d 1256, 1280 n. 3 (1978); Restatement,
supra, § 302, comment e at 310. Furthermore, the proposed
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justification is somewhat incredible since the Illinois Act applies to tender offers for any corporation for which 10% of the
outstanding shares are held by Illinois residents, Ill. Rev.
Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.52-10 (Supp. 1980). The Act thus
applies to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois
and have their principal place of business in other states. Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.
We conclude with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act
imposes a substantial on interstate commerce which outweighs its putative local benefits. It is accordingly invalid
under the Commerce Clause.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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JAMES EDGAR, APPELLANT v. MITE CORPORATION
AND MITE HOLDINGS, INC.
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FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the Illinois Business TakeOver Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.51, et seq. (Supp.
1980), is unconstitutional under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution.
I
Appellee MITE Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, MITE Holdings, Inc., are corporations organized under
the laws of Delaware with their principal executive offices in
Connecticut. Appellant James Edgar is the Secretary of
State of Illinois and is charged with the administration and
enforcement of the Illinois Act. Under the Illinois Act any
takeover offer 1 for the shares of a target company must be
registered with the Secretary of State. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch.
The Illinois Act defines "take-over offer'' as "the offer to acquire or the
acquisition of any equity security of a target company, pursuant to a tender
offer.... " Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 1/2, § 137.52-9 (Supp. 1980). "A
tender offer has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares
for sale at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender
Offer'' Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250,
1251 (1973). The terms "tender offer" and "takeover offer'' are often used
interchangeably.
1
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121 112, § 137.54.A (Supp. 1980). A target company is defined as a corporation or other issuer of securities of which
shareholders located in Illinois own 10% of the class of equity
securities subject to the offer, or for which any two of the following three conditions are met: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under the laws
of Illinois, or has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in
surplus represented within the state. Id., at § 137.52-10.
An offer becomes registered 20 days after a registration
statement is filed with the Secretary unless the Secretary
calls a hearing. Id., at§ 137.54.E. The Secretary may call
a hearing at any time during the 20-day waiting period to adjudicate the substantive fairness of the offer if he believes it
is necessary to protect the shareholders of the target company, and a hearing must be held if requested by a majority
of a target company's outside directors or by Illinois shareholders who own 10% of the class of securities subject to the
offer. !d., at§ 137.57.A. If the Secretary does hold a hearing, he is directed by the statute to deny registration to a
tender offer if he finds that it "fails to provide full and fair
disclosure to the offerees of all material information concerning the take-over offer, or that the take-over offer is inequitable or would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the
offerees .... " !d., at § 137.57.E.
On January 19, 1979, MITE initiated a cash tender offer for
all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine Co., a
publicly held Illinois corporation, by filing a Schedule 14D-1
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to
comply with the Williams Act. 2 The Schedule 14D-1 indi2

The Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454, et seq., codified at 15 U. S.C.

§§ 78m(d}-(e) and 78n(d}-(t), added new sections 13(d), 13(e) and 14(d}-(t)

to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 14(d)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act requires an offeror seeking to acquire more than five percent of any class of equity security by means of a tender offer to first file a
Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Schedule requires disclosure of the source of funds used to purchase the

80-1188--0PINION
EDGAR v. MITE CORP.

3

cated that MITE was willing to pay $28.00 per share for any
and all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet, a premium of approximately $4.00 over the then-prevailing market price.
MITE did not comply with the Illinois Act, however, and
commenced this litigation on the same day by filing an action
in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. The complaint asked for a declaratory judgment
that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and
violated the Commerce Clause. In addition, MITE sought a
temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent
injunctions prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from
enforcing the Illinois Act.
Chicago Rivet responded three days later by bringing suit
in Pennsylvania, where it conducted most of its business,
seeking to enjoin MITE from proceeding with its proposed
tender offer on the ground that the offer violated the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, 70 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 71 et
seq. (Supp. 1978). After MITE's efforts to obtain relief in
Pennsylvania proved unsuccessful, 3 both Chicago Rivet and
target shares, past transactions with the target company, and other material financial information about the offeror. In addition, the offeror must
disclose any antitrust or other legal problems which might result from the
success of the offer. 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981). Section 14(d)(1) requires the offeror to publish or send a statement of the relevant facts contained in the Schedule 14D-1 to the shareholders of the target company.
In addition, § 13(d), also added by the Williams Act, requires a purchaser
of any equity security registered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 781, to file a schedule 13D with the Commission
within ten days after its purchases have exceeded five percent of the outstanding shares of the security. Schedule 13D requires essentially the
same disclosures as required by Schedule 14D-1. Compare 17 CFR
§ 240.13d-101 (1981) with 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981).
8
In addition to filing suit in state court, Chicago Rivet filed a complaint
with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission requesting the Commission
to enforce the Pennsylvania Act against MITE. On January 31, 1979 the
Pennsylvania Securities Commission decided that it would not invoke the
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. The next day, the United States
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the Illinois Secretary of State took steps to invoke the Illinois
Act. On February 1, 1979, the Secretary of State notified
MITE that he intended to issue an order requiring it to cease
and desist further efforts to make a tender offer for Chicago
Rivet. On February 2, 1979 Chicago Rivet notified MITE
by letter that it would file suit in Illinois state court to enjoin
the proposed tender offer. MITE renewed its request for
injunctive relief in the District Court and on February 2 the
District Court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois Act against
MITE's tender offer for Chicago Rivet.
MITE then published its tender offer in the February 5
edition of the Wall Street Journal. The offer was made to all
shareholders of Chicago Rivet residing throughout the
United States. The outstanding stock was worth over $23
million at the offering price. On the same day Chicago Rivet
made an offer for approximately 40% of its own shares at
$30.00 per share. 4 The District Court entered final judgment on February 9, declaring that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and that it violated the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the District Court permanently
enjoined enforcement of the Illinois statute against MITE.
Shortly after final judgment was entered, MITE and Chicago
Rivet entered into an agreement whereby both tender offers
were withdrawn and MITE was given 30 days to examine the
books and records of Chicago Rivet. Under the agreement
MITE was either to make a tender offer of $31.00 per share
before March 12, 1979, which Chicago Rivet agreed not to opDistrict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to which MITE
had removed the state court action, denied Chicago Rivet's motion for a
temporary restraining order.
• Chicago Rivet's offer for its own shares was exempt from the requirements of the Illinois Act pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112,
§ 137.52-9.(4) (Supp. 1980).
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pose, or decide not to acquire Chicago Rivet's shares or assets. App. to Brief for Appellees 1a-4a. On March 2, 1979,
MITE announced its decision not to make a tender offer.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed sub nom. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F. 2d 486
(1980). It agreed with the District Court that several provisions of the Illinois Act are preempted by the Williams Act
and that the Illinois Act unduly burdens interstate commerce
in violation of the Commerce Clause. We noted probable jurisdiction, 451 U. S. 968 (1981), and now affirm.

II
The Court of Appeals specifically found that this case was
not moot, 633 F. 2d, at 490, reasoning that because the Secretary has indicated he intends to enforce the Act against
MITE, a reversal of the judgment of the District Court would
expose MITE to civil and criminal liability 5 for making the
February 5, 1979 offer in violation of the Illinois Act. We
agree. It is urged that the preliminary injunction issued by
the District Court is a complete defense to civil or criminal
penalties. While, as JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence indicates, that is not a frivolous question by any means, it is an
issue to be decided when and if the Secretary of State initiates an action. That action would be foreclosed if we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the case is not moot.
III
We first address the holding that the Illinois Takeover Act
is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. We note at
The Secretary of State may bring an action for civil penalties for violations of the Illinois Act., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1211/2, § 137.65 (Supp. 1980),
and a person who willfully violates the Act is subject to criminal prosecution. I d., at § 137.63.
5
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the outset that in passing the Williams Act, which is an
amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Congress did not also amend § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78bb(a). 6 In pertinent part, § 28(a) provides as follows:
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of
the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any state over any security or
any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder."
Thus Congress did not explicitly prohibit states from regulating takeovers; it left the determination whether the Illinois
statute conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts. Of
course, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually
conflicts with a valid federal statute; and,
"[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility
.. . ,'Florida Lime & A vocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state 'law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., supra, at 526, 54(}...541. Accord, De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 363 (1976)." Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 158 (1978).
Our inquiry is further narrowed in this case since there is no
contention that it would be impossible to comply with both
6

There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress was
aware of state takeover laws when it enacted the Williams Act. When the
Williams Act was enacted in 1968, only Virginia had a takeover statute.
The Virginia statute, Va. Code§ 131-528, became effective March 5, 1968;
the Williams Act was enacted several months later on July 19, 1968.
Takeover statutes are now in effect in 37 states. Sargent, On the Validity
of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell , 42
Ohio St. L. J. 689, 690 n. 7 (1981).
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the provisions of the Williams Act and the more burdensome
requirements of the Illinois law. The issue thus is, as it was
in the Court of Appeals, whether the Illinois Act frustrates
the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way.
The Williams Act, passed in 1968, was the congressional
response to the increased use of cash tender offers in corporate acquisitions, a device that had "removed a substantial
number of corporate control contests from the reach of
exsiting disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws." Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U. S. 1, 22
(1977). The Williams Act filled this regulatory gap. The
Act imposes several requirements. First, it requires that
upon the commencement of the tender offer, the offeror file
with the SEC, publish or send to the shareholders of the target company, and furnish to the target company detailed information about the offer. 15 U. S.C. §78(n)(d)(1), 17 CFR
§ 240.24d-3 (1981). The offeror must disclose information
about its background and identity; the source of the funds to
be used in making the purchase; the purpose of the purchase,
including any plans to liquidate the company or make major
changes in its corporate structure; and the extent of the
offeror's holdings in the target company. 15 U. S. C.
§ 78m(d)(l), 17 CFR § 240.13d-1 (1981). See also note 2,
supra. Second, stockholders who tender their shares may
withdraw them during the first seven days of a tender offer
and if the offeror has not yet purchased their shares, at any
time after sixty days from the commencement of the offer.
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5). 7 Third, all shares tendered must be
purchased for the same price; if an offering price is increased,
those who have already tendered receive the benefit of the
increase. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(7). 8
The seven-day withdrawal period contained in the Williams Act has
been extended to 15 business days by the Commission. 17 CFR
§ 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1981).
8
The Williams Act also provides that when the number of shares tendered exceeds the number of shares sought in the offer, those shares ten7
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There is no question that in imposing these requirements,
Congress intended to protect investors. Piper v. ChrisCraft Industries, supra, at 35; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 58 (1975); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-4 (1967) ("Senate Report"). But it is also crystal
clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor
was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover
bidder. As we noted in Piper, the disclosure provisions
originally embodied in S.2731 "were avowedly pro-management in the target company's efforts to defeat takeover
bids." 430 U. S., at 30. But Congress became convinced
"that takeover bids should not be discouraged because they
serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but
inefficient management." Senate Report at 3. 9 It also became apparent that entrenched management was often successful in defeating takeover attempts. As the legislation
evolved, therefore, Congress disclaimed any "intention to
provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover
bids ... " Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58,
and expressly embraced a policy of neutrality. As Senator
Williams explained, "We have taken extreme care to avoid
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of
the persons making the takeover bids." 113 Cong. Rec.
24664 (1967). This policy of "evenhandedness," Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries, supra, at 31, represented a conviction that neither side in the contest should be extended addidered during the first 10 days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata
basis. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(6). The Act also contains a general antifraud
provision, 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e), which has been interpreted to require disclosure of material information known to the offeror even if disclosure were
not otherwise required. See, e. g. Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F. 2d 247, 250 (CA 2 1973).
9
Congress also did not want to deny shareholders "the opportunities
which result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock of a given
company," namely the opportunity to sell shares for a premium over their
market price. 113 Cong. Rec. 24666 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
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tional advantages vis-a-vis the investor, who if furnished
with adequate information would be in a position to make his
own informed choice. We, therefore, agree with the Court
of Appeals that Congress sought to protect the investor not
only by furnishing him with the necessary information but
also by withholding from management or the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice. 633 F. 2d, at 496.
To implement this policy of investor protection while maintaining the balance between management and the bidder,
Congress required the latter to file with the Commission and
furnish the company and the investor with all information adequate to the occasion. With that filing, the offer could go
forward, stock could be tendered and purchased, but a stockholder was free within a specified time to withdraw his tendered shares. He was also protected if the offer was increased. Looking at this history as a whole, it appears to us,
as it did to the Court of Appeals, that Congress intended to
strike a balance between the investor, management and the
takeover bidder. The bidder was to furnish the investor and
the target company with adequate information but there was
no "intention to do ... more than give incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its position."
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58. Once that
opportunity was extended, Congress anticipated that the investor, if he so chose, and the takeover bidder should be free
to move forward within the time-frame provided by
Congress.
IV
The Court of Appeals identified three provisions of the Illinois Act that upset the careful balance struck by Congress
and which therefore stand as obstacles to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in all essential respects.
A
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The Illinois Act requires a tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to make a
tender offer and the material terms of the offer twenty business days before the offer becomes effective. Ill. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 121112, §§ 137.54.E, 137.54.B (Supp. 1980.) During that
time, the offeror may not communicate its offer to the shareholders. Id., at § 137.54.A. Meanwhile, the target company is free to disseminate information to its shareholders
concerning the impending offer. The contrast with the Williams Act is apparent. Under that Act, there is no pre-commencement notification requirement; the critical date is the
date a tender offer is "first published or sent or given to security holders." 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(l). See also 17 CFR
§ 240.14d-2 (1981).
We agree with with the Court of Appeals that by providing
the target company with additional time within which to take
steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notification
provisions furnish incumbent management with a powerful
tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the
stockholders who will not have an offer before them during
this period. 10 These consequences are precisely what Congress determined should be avoided, and for this reason, the
precommencement notification provision frustrates the objectives of the Williams Act.
It is important to note in this respect that in the course of
events leading to the adoption of the Williams Act, Congress
several times refused to impose a precommencement disclosure requirement. In October 1965, Senator Williams introduced S.2731, a bill which would have required a bidder to
notify the target company and file a public statement with
the Securities and Exchange Commission at least 20 days before commencement of a cash tender offer for more than five
per cent of a class of the target company's securities. 111
Cong. Rec. 28259 (1965). The Commission commented on
10

See note 11 and accompanying text, infra.
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the bill and stated that "the requirement of a 20-day advance
notice to the issuer and the Commission is unnecessary for
the protection of security holders ... " 112 Cong. Rec.
19005 (1966). Senator Williams introduced a new bill in
1967, S.510, which provided for a confidential filing by the
tender offeror with the Commission five days prior to the
commencement of the offer. S.510 was enacted as the Williams Act after elimination of the advance disclosure requirement. As the Senate Report explained,
"At the hearings it was urged that this prior review was
not necessary and in some cases might delay the offer
when time was of the essence. In view of the authority
and responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission to take appropriate action in the event that inadequate or misleading information is disseminated to the
public to solicit acceptance of a tender offer, the bill as
approved by the committee requires only that the statement be on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission at the time the tender offer is first made to the
public." Senate Report at 4.
Congress rejected another pre-commencement notification
proposal during deliberations on the 1970 amendments to the
Williams Act. 11
H. R. 4285, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The bill was not reported out
of the subcommittee. Instead, the Senate amendments to the Williams
Act, which did not contain pre-commencement notification provisions,
were adopted. Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated detailed
rules governing the conduct of tender offers. Rule 14d-2(b), 17 CFR
§ 240.14d-2(b) (1981), requires that a tender offeror make its offer effective
within five days of publicly announcing the material terms of the offer by
disseminating specified information to shareholders and filing the requisite
documents with the Commission. Otherwise the offeror must announce
that it is withdrawing its offer. The events in this litigation took place
prior to the effective date of Rule 14d-2(b), and because Rule 14d-2(b) operates prospectively only, see 44 Fed. Reg. 70326 (1979), it is not at issue
11
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B
For similar reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act frustrate the
congressional purpose by introducing extended delay into the
tender offer process. The Illinois Act allows the Secretary
of State to call a hearing with respect to any tender offer subject to the Act, and the offer may not proceed until the hearing is completed. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, §§ 137.57.A
and B (Supp. 1980) The Secretary may call a hearing at any
time prior to the commencement of the offer, and there is no
deadline for the completion of the hearing.
Id., at
§§ 137.57.C and D. Although the Secretary is to render a
decision within 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing,
that period may be extended without limitation. Not only
does the Secretary of State have the power to delay a tender
offer indefinitely, but incumbent management may also use
the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act to delay a tender offer. The Secretary is required to call a hearing if requested
to do so by, among other persons, those who are located in
Illinois "as determined by post office address as shown on the
records of the target company and who hold of record or beneficially, or both, at least 10% of the outstanding shares of
any class of equity securities which is the subject of the takeover offer." Id., at § 137.57.A. Since incumbent management in many cases will control, either directly or indirectly,
10% of the target company's shares, this provision allows
management to delay the commencement of an offer by insisting on a hearing. As the Court of Appeals observed,
these provisions potentially afford management a "powerful
weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover." 633 F. 2d, at
494. 12 In enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself "recogin this case.
12
Delay has been characterized as "the most potent weapon in a tender
offer fight. " Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects , and Political Competency, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 213, 238 (1977). See

80-1188-0PINION
EDGAR v. MITE CORP.

13

nized that delay can seriously impede a tender offer" and
sought to avoid it. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F. 2d 1256, 1277 (CA5 1978); Senate Report at 4. 13
Congress reemphasized the consequences of delay when it
enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 15 U. S. C. 12, et seq.
"[I]t is clear that this short waiting period [the ten-day
period for proration provided for by § 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act, which applies only after a tender
offer is commenced] was founded on congressional concern that a longer delay might unduly favor the target
firm's incumbent management, and permit them to frustrate many pro-competitive cash tenders. This ten-day
waiting period thus underscores the basic purpose of the
Williams Act-to maintain a neutral policy towards cash
tender offers, by avoiding lengthy delays that might discourage their chances for success." H. R. Rep. No.
94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976). 14
also Wachtel!, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. L. 1433,
1437-1442 (1977); Wilner and Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover
Laws and Their Constitutionality, 45 Ford. L. Rev. 1, !f.-10 (1976).
13
According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, delay enables
a target company to:
"(1) repurchase its own securities;
"(2) announce dividend increases or stock splits;
"(3) issue additional shares of stock;
"(4) acquire other companies to produce an antitrust violation should the
tender offer succeed;
"(5) arrange a defensive merger;
"(6) enter into restrictive loan agreements,
"(7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer." Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae 10, n. 8.
" Representative Rodino set out the consequences of delay in greater
detail when he described the relationship between the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act and the Williams Act:
"In the case of cash tender offers, more so than in other mergers, the equities include time and the danger of undue delay. This bill in no way in-
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As we have said, Congress anticipated investors and the
takeover offeror be free to go forward without unreasonable
delay. The potential for delay provided by the hearing provisions upset the balance struck by Congress by favoring
management at the expense of stockholders. We therefore
agree with the Court of Appeals that these hearing provisions conflict with the Williams Act.

c
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Illinois Act is
pre-empted by the Williams Act insofar as it allows the Secretary of State of Illinois to pass on the substantive fairness
of a tender offer. Under § 137.57.E of the Illinois law, the
Secretary is required to deny registration of a takeover offer
if he finds that the offer "fails to provide full and fair disclosure to the offerees . . . or that the take-over offer is inequitable . . . ." (Emphasis added). 15 The Court of Appeals understood the Williams Act and its legislative history to
tends to repeal or reverse the congresional purpose underlying the 1968
Williams Act, or the 1970 amendments to that act. . . . Lengthier delays
will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer, .by abolishing
cumulative voting, arranging a speedy defense merger, quickly incorporating in a State with an antitakeover statute, or negotiating costly lifetime
employment contracts for incumbent management. And the longer the
waiting period, the more the target's stock may be bid up in the market,
making the offer more costly-and less successful. Should this happen, it
will mean that shareholders of the target firm will be effectively deprived
of the choice that cash tenders give to them: Either accept the offer and
thereby gain the tendered premium, or reject the offer. Generally, the
courts have construed the Williams Act so as to maintain these two options
for the target company's shareholders, and the House Conferees contemplate that the courts will continue to do so." 122 Cong. Rec. 30877 (1976).
5
' Appellant argues that the Illinois Act does not permit him to ajudicate
the substantive fairness of a tender offer. Brief for Appellant 21-22. On
this state-law issue, however, we follow the view of the Court of Appeals
that§ 137.57.E allows the Secretary of State "to pass upon the substantive
fairness of a tender offer. . . ." 633 F. 2d, at 493.
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indicate that Congress intended for investors to be free to
make their own decisions. We agree. Both the House and
Senate Reports observed that the Act was "designed to make
the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair
opportunity to make their decision." H. R. Rep. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968); Senate Report at 3. Thus, as
the Court of Appeals said, "[t]he state thus offers investor
protection at the expense of investor autonomy-an approach
quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress." 633 F. 2d,
at 494.

v

The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have
Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several
states." U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "[A]t least since
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852), it has been
clear that 'the Commerce Clause. . . . even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the
power of the States."' Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366, 370-371 (1976), quoting Freeman v.
Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). See also Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 35 (1980). Not
every exercise of state power with some impact on interstate
commerce is invalid. A state statute must be upheld if it
"regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental ... unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970), citing
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443 (1960).
The Commerce Clause, however, permits only incidental
regulation of interstate commerce by the states; direct regulation is prohibited. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268
U. S. 189, 199 (1925). See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
supra, at 142. The Illinois Act violates these principles for
two reasons. First, it directly regulates and prevents, un-
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less its terms are satisfied, interstate tender offers which in
turn would generate interstate transactions. Second, the
burden the Act imposes on interstate commerce is excessive
in light of the local interests the Act purports to further.

A
States have traditionally regulated intrastate securities
transactions, 16 and this Court has upheld the authority of
states to enact "blue-sky" laws against Commerce Clause
challenges on several occasions. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U. S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards
Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co.,
242 U. S. 568 (1917). The Court's rationale for upholding
blue-sky laws was that they only regulated transactions occurring within the regulating states. "The provisions of the
law . . . apply to dispositions of securities within the State
and while information of those issued in other States and foreign countries is required to be filed . . . they are only affected by the requirement of a license of one who deals with
them within the State. . . . Such regulations affect interstate commerce in securities only incidentally." Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., supra, at 557-558 (cites omitted). Congress
has also recognized the validity of such laws governing intrastate securities transactions in § 28a of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a), a provision "designed to
save state blue-sky laws from preemption." Leroy v. Great
Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 182, n. 13 (1979).
The Illinois Act differs substantially from state blue-sky
laws in that it directly regulates transactions which take
place across state lines, even if wholly outside the State of
Illinois. A tender offer for securities of a publicly-held corporation is ordinarily communicated by the use of the mails or
16

For example, the Illinois Blue Sky law, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2,

§ 137.1, et seq. (Supp. 1980), provides that securities subject to the law
must be registered "prior to sale in this State . ... " I d., at § 137.5.
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other means of interstate commerce to shareholders across
the country and abroad. Securities are tendered and transactions closed by similar means. Thus, in this case, MITE
Corporation, the tender offeror, is a Delaware corporation
with principal offices in Connecticut. Chicago Rivet is a
publicly-held Illinois corporation with shareholders scattered
around the country, 27% of whom live in Illinois. Mite's
offer to Chicago Rivet's shareholders, including those in Illinois, necessarily employed interstate facilities in communicating its offer, which, if accepted, would result in transactions occurring across state lines. These transactions would
themselves be interstate commerce. Yet the Illinois law,
unless complied with, sought to prevent Mite from making its
offer and concluding interstate transactions not only with
Chicago Rivet's stockholders living in Illinois, but also with
those living in other states and having no connection with Illinois. Indeed, the Illinois law on its face would apply even if
not a single one of Chicago Rivet's shareholders were a resident of Illinois, since the Act applies to every tender offer for
a corporation meeting two of the following conditions: the
corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under Illinois laws, or has at least 10% of its stated
capital and paid-in surplus represented in Illinois. Ill. Rev.
Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.52-10.(2) (Supp. 1980). Thus the Act
could be applied to regulate a tender offer which would not
affect a single Illinois shareholder.
It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct
restraint on interstate commerce and that it has a sweeping
extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, if Illinois may impose
such regulations, so may other states; and interstate commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers
would be thoroughly stifled. In Shafer v. Farmers Grain
Co., 268 U. S., at 199, the Court held that "a state statute
which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or
burdens ... [interstate] commerce is a prohibited regulation
and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was en-
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acted." See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U. S. 794, 806 (1976). The Commerce Clause also precludes
the application of a state statute to commerce that takes
place wholly outside of the state's borders, whether or not
the commerce has effects within the state. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 775 (1945), the Court
struck down on Commerce Clause grounds a state law where
the "practical effect of such regulation is to control ... [conduct] beyond the boundaries of the state .... " The limits on
a state's power to enact substantive legislation are similar to
the limits on the jurisdiction of state courts. In either case,
"any attempt 'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the State's power." Shafer v.
Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 197 (1977).
Because the Illinois Act purports to regulate directly and
to interdict interstate commerce, including commerce wholly
outside the state, it must be held invalid as were the laws at
issue in Shafer and Southern Pacific.
B
The Illinois Act is also unconstitutional under the test of
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S., at 142, for even when
a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the
burden imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in
relation to the local interests served by the statute. The
most obvious burden the Illinois Act imposes on interstate
commerce arises from the statute's previously-described nationwide reach which purports to give Illinois the power to
determine whether a tender offer may proceed anywhere.
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to
block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a
premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their
highest-valued use, a process which can improve efficiency
and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer
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mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well
so that stock prices remain high is reduced.
See
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1161, 1173-1174 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 5, 27-28, 45
(1978); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1976).
Appellant claims the Illinois Act furthers two legitimate
local interests. He argues that Illinois seeks to protect resident security holders and that the Act merely regulates the
internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that these asserted interests are insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois imposes on interstate commerce.
While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state
objective, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
non-resident shareholders. Insofar as the Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed
in the balance to sustain the law. We note, furthermore,
that the Act completely exempts from coverage a corporation's acquisition of its own shares. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121
112, § 137.52.09.4. Thus Chicago Rivet was able to make a
competing tender offer for its own stock without complying
with the Illinois Act, leaving Chicago Rivet's shareholders to
depend only on the protections afforded them by federal securities law, protections which Illinois views as inadequate to
protect investors in other contexts. This distinction is at
variance with Illinois' asserted legislative purpose, and tends
to undermine appellant's justification for the burdens the
statute imposes on interstate commerce.
We are also unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially
enhances the shareholders' position. The Illinois Act seeks
to protect shareholders of a company subject to a tender offer
by requiring disclosures regarding the offer, assuring that
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shareholders have adequate time to decide whether to tender
their shares, and according shareholders withdrawal, proration and equal consideration rights. However, the Williams
Act provides these same substantive protections, compare
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, §§ 137.59.C, D, and E (Supp.
1980) (withdrawal, proration, and equal consideration rights)
with 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5), (6) and (7) and 17 CFR
§240.14d-7 (1981) (same). As the Court of Appeals noted,
the disclosures required by the Illinois Act which go beyond
those mandated by the Williams Act and the regulations pursuant to it may not substantially enhance the shareholders'
ability to make informed decisions. 633 F. 2d, at 500. It
also was of the view that the possible benefits of the potential
delays required by the Act may be outweighed by the increased risk that the tender offer will fail due to defensive
tactics employed by incumbent management. We are unprepared to disagree with the Court of Appeals in these respects, and conclude that the protections the Illinois Act affords resident security holders are, for the most part,
speculative.
Appellant also contends that Illinois has an interest in
regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated
under its laws. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of
laws principle which recognizes that only one state should
have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be
faced with conflicting demands. See Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws, § 302, Comment b at 307-308 (1971).
That doctrine is of little use to the state in this context.
Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders
to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal
affairs of the target company. Great Western United Corp.
v. Kidwell, 577 F. 2d, at 1280, n. 53; Restatement, supra,
§ 302, comment e at 310. Furthermore, the proposed justifi-
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cation is somewhat incredible since the Illinois Act applies to
tender offers for any corporation for which 10% of the outstanding shares are held by Illinois residents, Ill. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 121 112, § 137.52--10 (Supp. 1980). The Act thus applies
to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and have
their principal place of business in other states. Illinois has
no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign
corporations.
We conclude with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act
imposes a substantial on interstate commerce which outweighs its putative local benefits. It is accordingly invalid
under the Commerce Clause.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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Justice Powell, concurring in part.
I agree with Justice Marshall that this case is
moot.
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In viewl of the decision of a majority of the Court
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Memorandum to Justice Powell
Re:

Edgar v. Mite

The voting on this case breaks down as follows:
BRW:

Preemption -- CJ; HAB {tentative)
Commerce Clause --CJ; JPS; SOC

TM:
WHR:

WJB
No one else.

As a result, no one theory currently commands a Court.

BRW

does, however, have 5 votes for a judgment.
In this situation, I have three recommendations.
1.

The

recommendation

that

I

urge

the most

strongly

is

that you stick by TM and his mootness vote.

I have made this case

before and will not bore you at length now.

But I think that once

you agree that the Court
analysis

for

you.

is without jurisdiction, this should end

Further

comment

seems

to me

to be dicta.

It

seems especially anomalous that such "dicta" should cast the deciding vote for a particular theory that then becomes binding precedent
until overruled.
2.

If

you

disagree,

my next

recommendation

is

that you

select the narrowest of the many available alternative theories to
resolve the merits of this case.

Unquestionably the narrowest of

BRW's theories is his preemption analysis {Parts III and IV).

This

2.

analysis applies only to tender offer laws,
and could have no possi, .
ble application to state blue sky statutes.

In addition,

I agree

with the numerous commentators on this point that Congress sought to
preserve

a

neutrality

completely well

with which

intentioned

undoubtedly interfere.

state

takeover

and perhaps of

laws -- although

superior wisdom -- do

This interference is plain from the frequen-

cy with which target companies attempt resort to state statute protection.
This
tender

holding

offer

area

by

the

and would

Court

would

not

extend

leave the problem for

believes that the Court has erred.

outside

Congress

if

the
it

Your vote would leave this case

with only pluralities for each of theories on the merits.

But you

may view this a something of an advantage if you are reluctant to
make binding law in a case that you believe is moot.
3.
Part VB.

If you disagree again, I recommend that you join BRW's

This portion of his Commerce Clause analysis is narrower

that Part VA.

Both A and B possibly could be read as threatening

state blue sky laws, which do have some extraterritorial effect in
halting

stock

sales

that

are

not completely

intrastate.

Part B,

however, is narrower than Part A in that it is tied more directly to
the characteristics and

justifications for

the particular Illinois

statute here under attack.
The Commerce Clause holding

again would

susceptible to ultimate congressional review.

leave the matter

But the holding would

be broader than the preemption analysis because of the relevance of
the holding to state laws outside of the tender offer context -notably state blue sky statutes.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 1 6, 19 8 2

No. 80-1188

Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear Byron,
After revising my own views about this
case more than once, I have decided to join Parts I,
II and V of your opinion.
I will circulate a paragraph so stating.
Sincerely,

Justice White

Copies to the Conference
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-
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June 17, 1982

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear Byron:
Just for the record,
and IV of your opinion.

I formally join Parts I, II,

III,

According to my notes, you have a Court for Parts I,
II, and V-B, four votes for Part V-A and three votes for
Parts III and IV.
Sincerely,

Justice White
cc: The Conference
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Cl-iAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 18, 1982

I

Memorandum to the Conference
Re:

No.

80-1188

Edgar v. Mite

I may suggest to Henry Lind that he include the following as
part of the syllabus in Edgar v. Mite--for the benefit of
confused readers. What do you think?
The votes for Justice White's opinion are as follows:
Parts

I

II

III

IVA

!VB

IVC

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

VA

VB

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

- 2 -

There are five votes for parts I ·(statement of the case) , II
(mootness) , and VB (invalid under commerce clause) .
There are six separate opinions.
1) Justice White
2) Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting on
mootness grounds.
3) Justice Rehnquist, dissentiDg on mootness grounds.
4) Justice Powell, concurring in part.
5) Justice Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
6) Justice O'Connor, concurring in part.
The votes have shifted as follows:
1) Justice Marshall circulates opinion for the Court.
2) Justice Brennan joins.
3) Justice Rehnquist joins.
4) Justice Powell joins.
5) Justice White circulates a dissent.
6) Justice Stevens circulates a dissent.
7) Justice Blackmun joins Justice White.
8) Justice O'Connor joins Justice Stevens.
9) The Chief Justice joins Justice Marshall.
10) Justice Rehnquist changes vote.
11) The Chief Justice changes vote.
12) Justice White circulates opinion for the Court.
13) Justice Marshall circulates dissent.
14) Justice Brennan joins Justice Marshall.
15) Justice Stevens circuates concurring opinion.
16) Justice Rehnquist circulates dissent.
17) The Chief Justice joins Justice White.
18) Justice O'Connor concurs.
19) Justice Powell concurs.
20) Justice Blackmun concurs.
Sincerely,

TM
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CHAMB E R S OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 18, 1982

Re:

80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corp.

Dear Thurgood,
You are

just envious.

Counting all of

the x's set out, I bet you have never had as
many votes
proud

of

for
each

any of your opinions.
of

these

votes,

I

am

especially

since some of them add up to an opinion for
the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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C HAM BE R S OF

JU S TICE JOHN P AUL S T E V E NS

June 18, 1982

Re:

80-1188 - Eagar v. Mite Corp.

Dear Thurgood:
If you can devise a three-dimensional device
that will reflect the information on page one ana the
information on page two simultaneously--ana if ATEX
can print it without blowing a fuse ana thereby
making Bill miss the ferry--I will join your proposed
syllabus.
Respectfully,

J~
Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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near

~vron:

~hurqood's

wonderful "charting" of the gyrations

of the "Brothers and Sister" in this case should make the

history ho0ks.
I note that among thos~ who have "avrated", I may
be tied for the leadershiP with John. Not wishing to be
outdone, my final vote is to join Parts I and V-B onlv - as
expressed in the enclosed revision of my little concurrence.

I look forward to hearing you announce this case
and to what the reporters say about it.

Sincerely,

,Just i.CP

ril, i

te

J fo/sc;

cc:

The Conference

Justice
Justice
Jus·tice
Justice
Justice
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Brennan
White
Marshall
Blackmun
Relmquist
Stevens
O'Connor

Justi~s
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Powell
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80-1188 Edgar v. Mite

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part.
I agree with Justice Marhsa11 that this case is
moot.

In view, however, of the decision of majority of the

Court to reach the merits, I join Parts I and V-B of the
Court's opinion.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

June 19, 1982

80-1188 Edgar v. Mite

Dear Byron:
Thurgood's wonderful "charting" of the gyrations
of the "Brothers and Sister" in this case should make the
history books.
I note that among those who have "gyrated", I may
be tied for the leadership with John. Not wishing to be
outdone, my final vote is to join Parts I and V-B only - as
expressed in the enclosed revision of my little concurrence.
I look forward to hearing you announce this case
and to what the reporters say about it.
Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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Memorandum to Justice Powell

Re:

Edgar v. Mite
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The introduction to Part V (pp. 15-16)

linois Act violates the Commerce Clause for two reasons:

"First, it

directly

satisfied,

regulates

and

prevents,

unless

interstate tender offers which [sic!]
state transaction.

its

terms

are

in turn would generate inter-

Second, the burden the Act imposes on interstate

commerce is excessive in light of the local interests the Act purports to further."

The two subsequent subparts elaborate these dis-

tinct and alternative rationales.
Part VA focuses on the "direc[t]" geographic effect of the
"----'

state law.

P. 16.

It stresses that the Illinois Act "directly reg-

ulates transactions which rsic!] take place across state lines, even
if

wholly

outside

the

State

of

Illinois."

p.

16.

It

is

this

"sweeping extraterritorial effect" that is found to condemn the law,
p.

17,

This

irrespective

section

argues

of

the

simply

State's
that

~

purpose

in

enacting

such expansive

the

law.

regulation

is

beyond State power.
Part VB concentrates on weighing the "indirec [t]" burdens
of the State's regulation against "the local interests served by the
statute."

P. 18.

BRW concludes this weighing by finding that the

indirect effects are "substantial," p. 18, while Illinois' "asserted
interests are insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois imposes
on interstate commerce."

P. 19.

2.

Parts VA and VB are alternative because the two arguments
do not build on each other and each concludes that the state law is
invalid.

Part VB

is

narrower

than part VA because VB takes

------.,

account the State's asserted interests in its law.

into

A law with the

same extraterritorial effect but with stronger justifications might
have survived part VB.
ever,

because

that

It logically could not survive part VA, howsection

extraterritorrial effect.

looks

only

to

the

extent

of

It engages in no balancing.

Part III is just an exposition of preemption principles in
the context of

the Williams Act.

It

is completely

irrelevant to

resolution of the case on grounds of parts VA and VB.

Your join of

this section in effect would constitute a broad gauge expression of
dicta.
In sum,
that you
case,

if you do not wish to join part II,

join only parts I

and VB.

I

recommend

This completely resolves the

but does so on the narrowest Commerce Clause grounds -- thus

creating the smallest degree of risk to state blue sky laws.
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CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

June 21, 1982

80-1188 Edgar v. Mite

Dear Byron:
Here is the paragraph that I mentioned this
morning as being something I would like to add to my little
concurring statement. It explains - what is not self
evident - why I join only Part V-B of the operative portion
of your opinion.
I should have done this much earlier, and
therefore have said that if this addition would hold you up
I will scrub it.
I am delivering copies to the printer and
to Henry Lind.
This also will enable Thurgood to make an
additional entry in his chart.
Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference
Mr. Henry Lind

----

lfp/ss 06/21/82

Rider A, Mite

MITEA SALLY-POW

I join only Part V-B because its Commerce Clause
reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender
offers.

In a period in our history marked by conglomerate

corporate

formations

antitrust

laws,

it

essentially
is

far

from

unrestricted
clear

to

me

by

the

that

the

Williams Act's policy of "neutrality" operates fairly or
in

the

public

interest.

Often

the

offeror

possesses

resources, in terms of professional personnel experienced
in takeovers

as

well as

in capital,

those of the takeover target.

that vastly exceed

This disparity in resources

may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional
target corporation.
assume

corporate

resources.

The Williams Act provisions seem to
entities

of

substantially

equal

Moreover, in terms of general public interest,

when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and
State inevitably there are certain adverse consequences.*
I therefore agree with Justice Stevens that the Williams
Act should not necessarily be read as prohibiting state
legislation
circumstances

designed

to

greater

assure
protection

at

least

in

some

to

interests

that

L..

include

but

often

are

broader

than

those

of

incumbent

management.

*The corporate headquarters of the great national and
multi-national corporations tend to be located in the
large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters
are transferred out of a city and State into one of these
metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which
the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly.
Management
personnel
many of whom have provided
community leadership
may move to the new corporate
headquarters.
Contributions to cultural, charitable, and
educational life
both in terms of leadership and
financial support - also tend to diminish when there is a
move of corporate headquarters.
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evident - why I ioin only Part V-R of the opera.tive portion
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therefore have said that if this addition would hol<i you up
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This also will enable Thurgood to make an
additional entry in his chart.
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Justice White
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cc: The Conference
Mr. Henry Lind
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MITEA SALLY-POW

I join only Part V-B because its Commerce Clause
reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender
offers.

In a period in our history marked by conglomerate

corporate

formations

antitrust

laws,

essentially
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is

far

from

unrestricted
clear

to
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by

the

that

the

Williams Act's policy of "neutrality" operates fairly or
in

the

public

interest.
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the

offeror

possesses
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in

takeovers

as well as

in capital,

those of the takeover target.

that vastly exceed

This disparity in resources

may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional
target corporation.
assume

corporate

resources.

The Williams Act provisions seem to
entities

of

substantially

equal

Moreover, in terms of general public interest,

when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and
State inevitably there are certain adverse consequences.*
I

therefore agree with Justice Stevens that the Williams

Act should not necessarily be read as prohibiting state
legislation
circumstances

designed

to

greater

assure

at

least

in

some

protection

to

interests

that

include

but

often

are

broader

than

those

of

incumbent

management.

*The corporate headquarters of the great national and
multi-national corporations tend to be located in the
large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters
are transferred out of a city and State into one of these
metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which
the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly.
Management personnel
many of whom have provided
community leadership
may move to the new corporate
headquarters.
Contributions to cultural, charitable, and
educational life
both in terms of leadership and
financial support - also tend to diminish when there is a
move of corporate headquarters.
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CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

March 1, 1982

No. 80-1188

Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear John,
Although I voted at Conference to decide this case
on mootness, your dissent is persuasive.
Please join me in it.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens

Copies to the Conference

~tttyrtutt

Qfourl of tqt ~ttittb .§tait.s'
~a.s'Irhtgton, ~. Qf. 2llgi-Jl.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 1, 1982

No. 80-1188

Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear John,
Although I voted at Conference to decide this case
on mootness, your dissent is persuasive.
Please join me in it.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens

Copies to the Conference

.:§up-umt <!)'curt crf t4t ~nittb ~tat.Hl
~lll1lfitt¢att. ~· <!J. 2ll6i)!,~

March 1 ,

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re :

No . 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corporatio n

Dear Byron :
This case has given me much difficulty .
agree with your dissent . Please join me .
Sincerely ,

I~

---

Justice White
cc: The Conference

I

now

.:§uvrtmt <!Jllltd a£ tqt ~nittb ;§tab%'
Jlct.S'fthtgton,~. <!J. 21l.;l't~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 1, 1982

No. 80-1188

Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear Thurgood,
Although I initially thought th'
resolved on the grounds of rnootness
!s c~se could be
sufficient concerns that I now b 1.'
Johns
dissent raises
1

!;r~~s~he

basis of mootness and

!e ~~~u~~ ~~~~~~ ~~to~e~~~e

Accordingly, I am unable to join the draft
opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall

Copies to the Conference

~ttpttntt

Qfonrl of tqt 'ltnitt~ ~taftg

~ail ftitt.g:tcn.

1B. <g.

2!1,? .lt~

CHAMBERS OF

'

. '

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

No. 80-1188

~

Edgar v.

Mit~

Dear Thurgood:
I join.
Regards,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

C6rp.

I

jsw

03/17/82

Memorandum to Justice Powell
Re:

Edgar v. Mite Corp.

Justice Rehnquist's switch of his vote in this case, combined with the Chief's announcement that he is reviewing his position,

has

thrown

this case

into the

air.

As

presently there are four to reach the merits
that we

should not

I

count the votes,

(two via BRW's theory

"reach" the mootness issue, and two via JPS' s

theory that federal courts cannot convey durable protection in the
form of a preliminary
moot

(including your

injunction);
vote and

four

to dismiss and vacate as

the Chief's shaky vote) ; and WHR' s

vote to dismiss the appeal and leave the CA7 decision in place.
first

thing

evenly

that comes

divided Court.

nine Justices vote.

to mind
But

The

is affirmance on the basis of an

that doctrine

seems

inapplicable when

I suppose this means that the "dissenters" who

believe the Court can reach the merits have the stronger claim on
WHR's vote; he at least would leave the CA7 opinion standing instead
of vacating it as moot.
Obviously
before
finding

this case

there will have
issues.

the case moot.

I

to

be

some

further

discussion

still believe that TM is correct

in

I do confess, however, that JPS's dissent

has shaken my conviction a bit.

His best point is that a vacated

2.

injunction cannot still have the force to bar Illinois' subsequent
prosecution of Mite.

I think that that inju'nction, though vacated,

would still bar Illinois' action on Supremacy Clause grounds.
DC found Mite had a

federal right to engage in its conduct.

The
Mite

could plead this a federal defense to any future prosecution by Illinois.
In short,

I think you should stay with TM for the present

and await future developments.

~

~u.puntt

<qcnrl llf t~t~~ ~taftg
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 1 7, 1982

Re :

No. 80-1188 - Edgar v . Mite Corp.

Dear Thurgood :
This case has been very difficult for everyone,
beginning with the Conference discussion . In light of
all the writing I am now going back over all the exchanges
and the Conference itself . There were roughly fo u r
different positions at Conference .

. "·-~ ..

My own concluding comment was that the intervening
developments seemed to make this case moot . Alternatively ,
I said I could probably affirm but not on the rationale
of the Seventh Circuit . As it should , the continuing
exchanges have ventilated the subject more fully than
was possible at the Conference .
As soon as I complete my re-examination I will
"report ."
Regards ,

~G)

....
'

Justice Marshal l
Copies to the Conference

<qo url of Up• 'JiUtit t b ~tl:ttts
1trasfrington, gl. <q. 2!l~Jt.;1

~u:pumr

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIS T

-#-r
March 17, 1982

Re: No. 80-1188

Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear Thurgood:

,,
'

As I let you know just a short while ago, I have become
more and more uneasy with my position in this case as the
debate between you, John, and Byron has escalated. With the
increasing prominence, in each of the recirculations, which
has been given to the i ~sue of l Lability for the imr rovident
iss Q9 nce o,l an injunction (a que st1o n whi af I gatner t hat
all ~ ree is one ot Ei r St impression} I now find myself in
the embarrassing position of having to withdraw my previous
partial "join" and partial concurrence in the result.
Although the iss~e of mootness is adequately briefed by the
parties, the factual assertions which they necessarily make
to support their positions are, in my view, not adequately
documented in this skimpy record.
I think it is something
akin to the tail wagging the dog to decide the injunction
issue in order to dispose of the mootness question:
the
latter simply consists of the application of well recognized
principles to this particular case, while the former is an
important and novel issue.
Would you, therefore, please note at the end of your
opinion the following:
"JUSTICE REHNQUIST, believing that it is
impossible to dispose of the issue of mootness in
this case without deciding far-reaching questions
of first impression tendered on a record all but
barren of the factual development necessary to
their decision, would dismiss the appeal. See
Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583

-

2 -

(1972); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S.
549 (1947) ."
Sincerely,

,V

~

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

.

'·•

March 17, 1982

80-1188 l'.!dgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear Thurgood:
I am st i 1J with you.

Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
cc:

~he

Conference

<qourt rrf Hrt ~t.cb ~._ts
'J!l'fas fringwn, IB . <g. 2ll.?'* 2

.§uprttnt

CHAMB E RS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 8, 1982

Re:

No. 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corp.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
My memo of March 17 reflected "second thoughts"
arising from the differing views that emerged in the
several separate and dissenting opinions.
I now conclude that I am in general agreement
with Byron's latest draft.

" (I

.§u.p-rnnt Qfonrl of tlrt ~q .§taft5
~rurlyi:ng-Ltn,llJ. <!f. 211,?~~ · ·
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 21, 1982

Re :

80-1188 - Edgar v. l1ite Corp.

Dear Byron:
In view of the exchanges, it appears the case should
be assigned to you .
Regards ,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

~tt:pr ttttt ~!lllrt d tft t ~nib~ ~tab$'
~curftington,lliJ. ~· 2.0.;;:'1-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 23, 1982

Re:

80-1188

Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Dear Byron,
In reviewing my notes on this case it appears that I
thought the extraterritorial aspects of the Illinois statute
interfere impermissibly with interstate commerce.
I
also thought the Williams Act did not preempt the state law
because Congress had not expressed such an intent.
I am
still of the same view unless persuaded otherwise by the
writing.
Sincerely,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

.iupuutt Clftturl!tf tltt ~t~ j\bdts
Jras!pngbm. ~. <4~ 2ll.?'!~
CHAMB E R S OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 3, 1982
Re:

No. 80-1188

Edgar v. Mite Corp.

Dear Byron:
You have inquired each of the last couple of Conferences
how we all stood on this case since it has been reassigned
to you.
I did not volunteer any position, because I have
wandered all over the lot as it is, and wanted to be fairly
sure that if I did make some statement there would be a
reasonable probability that I would stick to it.
I have done
a fair amount of thinking about the case, and while I still
cannot join Thurgood's proposed disposition concluding that
the case is moot, I think that by following a different route
I can avoid confronting the "injunction" issue debated between
Thurgood and John and nonetheless conclude it is moot.
I
find support for my position in Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri,
361 U.S. 363 (1960), and American Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 U.S.
49 (1904).
Sincerely,

WJv

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

/

To:

Justice Stevens

From:

David DeBruin

Date:

May 3, 1982

Justice Rehnquist relies on Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri,
361 U.S. 363, to conclude that Mite is moot.

In Oil Workers, a

state statute authorized the Governor to take possession of any
public utility aff e cted by a work stoppage when in his opinion
"the public interest, health and welfare are jeopardized."

The

statute prohibited any concerted refusal to work after the
utility had been taken over by the State.
after that time,
penalties, and

If a union struck

(1) the union became subject to statutory

(2) the strike could be enjoined by a state court.

In Oil Workers, a union struck a gas company after an
existing collective bargaining agr~ement expired .
later the Governor took possession of the utility .
seizure, the union continued to strike .
court then followed.

After the

Two actions in state

In one action, the State sought an

injunction against the strike .

In the second, the State sought

monetary p e nalties from the union.
the first case .

Five days

The injunction was granted i n

The union then terminated its strike and

negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement with the
utility.

The union nevertheless challenged the injunction on

appeal , contending that the state statute under which i t was

-

granted was unconstitutional.

2 -

The Missouri Supreme Court

recognized that the injunction had "expired by its own terms,"
b~t

considered the merits of the union's challenge to the

statute.

The state court upheld the constitutionality of the

statute and affirmed the order that enjoined the union from
continuing its strike.

On appeal, this Court held that the case was moot.

Since

the union had terminated its strike, the propriety of the
injunction issued against it was no longer a live issue.

The

Court also stated that the pendency of the separate damages
action was irrelevant.

Noting that the statutory p e nalties did

not turn on the validity of the injunction, the Court held that
"when [the damages] claim is litigated it will be subject to
review, but it is not for us now to anticipate its outcome."

Oil Workers is quite different from Mite.

The potential

liability of the union in Oil Workers for the statutory penalty
resulted entirely from the fact that it had violated the terms of
the statute.

The fact that the union had later be en specifically

enjoined from violating the statute could not affect the union's
statutory liability for damages.

The only effect of the

injunction was to permit the State to seek contempt penalties in
addition to the monetary p e nalty set forth in the statute.

Of

course, if this Court had considered the merits and determined
whether the issuance of the injunction had been proper, it also
would have determined whether the union was liable for the

-

statutory penalty.

3 -

The Court refused to hold, however, that the

first action was not moot simply because its resolution would
affect an open issue in the second.

In Mite, the party subject to the injunction did not cease
its arguably unlawful conduct; rather, the party protected by the
injunction did so.

In Mite it is the State that was restrained

from enforcing its statute, and the State has not abandoned its
desire to do so.

The State currently is prohibited from

enforcing the statute by the federal court's injunction.

If that

injunction was issued properly, the State will remain permanently
enjoined from taking the action that it wishes to take; if the
injunction was improper, the State will be free to seek monetary
penalties.

The validity of the injunction is very much a live

issue in this case.

There are two possible bases on which to conclude that this
case is moot:

-

(l) the injunction granted Mite absolute immunity

from a future enforcement action, whether or not the injunction
was issued properly; or

(2) Mite has no interest in whether or

not the State may bring an enforcement action against it, since
it can always defend that action by asserting its arguments that
the statute is unconstitutional.
addressed in our dissent.

The first argument has been

The second is equally insufficient;

Mite certainly has an interest in avoiding the uncertainty and
costs of a future enforcement proceeding, even though it
ultimately may prevail on the merits in such a proceeding.

.iuprtnu <lfourl of tltt ~tb ~taits
-asftingbm. ~. <If. 21l.?'!~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 3, 1982
Re:

No. 80-1188

Edgar v. Mite Corp.

Dear Byron:
You have inquired each of the last couple of Conferences
how we all stood on this case since it has been reassigned
to you.
I did not volunteer any position, because I have
wandered all over the lot as it is, and wanted to be fairly
sure that if I did make some statement there would be a
reasonable probability that I would stick to it.
I have done
a fair amount of thinking about the case, and while I still
cannot join Thurgood's proposed disposition concluding that
the case is moot, I think that by following a different route
I can avoid confronting the "injunction" issue debated between
Thurgood and John and nonetheless conclude it is moot.
I
find support for my position in Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri,
361 u.s. 363 (1960), and American Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 U.S.
49 (1904).
Sincerely,
/
{;()l,A•.
Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBE RS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 4, 1982

Re:

80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corp.

Dear Byron:
On the merits I have grave doubts about the
validity of the Court of Appeals' pre-emption
analysis, but I am satisfied that the Illinois
statute imposes an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.
Respectfully ,

;~
Justice White
Copies to the Conference

P.S . For the reasons set forth in the attached
memorandum prepared by David DeBruin , Bill
Rehnquist's citation of the Oil Workers case does not
change my opinion that the case is not moo t.

.§nprtttU
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CHAMB E RS 0 F

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 4, 1982

Re:

80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corp.

Dear Byron:
On the merits I have grave doubts about the
validity of the Court of Appeals' pre-emption
analysis, but I am satisfied that the Illinois
statute imposes an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.
Respectfu

J~t.._
Justice White
Copies to the Conference

P.S. For the reasons set forth in the attached
memorandum prepared by David DeBruin, Bill
Rehnquist's citation of the Oil Workers case does not
change my opinion that the case is not moot.
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V~tkf-{~D!F~~k-1/'~
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~)
No. 80-1188

4. ~

JAMES EDGAR, APPELLANT v. MITE CORPORATION
AND MITE HOLDINGS, INC.
_

~

~~

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS / _ . -:36
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
~
.4
[June - , 1982]
.,4- ~ JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the Illinois Business TakeOver Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.51 , et seq. (Supp.
1980), is unconstitutional under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution.

/J

~

_

.

-

I _
/~ -

I
Appellee MITE Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, MITE Holdings, Inc. , are corporations organized under
the laws of Delaware with their principal executive offices in
-11 ~ ~ .. .. .A _ 11
Connecticut. Appellant James Edgar is the Secretary of
State of Illinois and is charged with the administration and ~ /~
enforcement of the Illinois Act. Under the Illinois Act any ~ '~~c.
takeover offer 1 for the shares of a corporation must be regis- .
•
tered with the Secretary of State if 10% of the class of equity ~)

1-

if- 1111/JC-

1~

, The Illinois Act defines "take-over offer" as "the offer to acquire or the d ,/{ 4/
c;;_
acquisition of any equity security of a target company pursuant to a tender ~ ..!/'..lf!e
offer . .. ." Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 1/2, § 137.52-9 (Supp. 1980). "A
tender offer has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares
for sale at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender
Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250,
1251 (1973). The terms "tender offer" and "takeover offer" are often used
interchangeably.

80-1188--0PIN ION
2

EDGAR v. MITE CORP.

securities subject to the offer are owned by shareholders residing in Illinois or if any two of the following conditions are
met: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under the laws of Illinois, or has at least
10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented
within the state. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.52-9 and
10 (Supp. 1980). An offer becomes registered 20 days after a
registration statement is filed with the Secretary unless the
Secretary calls a hearing. ld., at §137.54(E). The Secretary may call a hearing at any time during the 20-day waiting
period to adjudicate the substantive fairness of the offer if he
believes it is necessary to protect the shareholders of the target company, and a hearing must be held if requested by a
majority of a target company's outside directors or by Illinois
shareholders who own 10% of the class of securities subject to
the offer. Id., at§ 137.57(A). If the Secretary does hold a
hearing, he is directed by the statute to deny registration to a
tender offer if he finds that it "fails to provide full and fair
disclosure to the offerees of all material information concerning the take-over, or that the take-over offer is inequitable or
would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the
offerees .... " ld., at§ 137.57.E.
On January 19, 1979, MITE initiated a cash tender offer for
all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine Co., a
publicly held Illinois corporation, by filing a Schedule 14D-1
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to
comply with the Williams Act. 2 The Schedule 14D-1 indi2

The Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454, et seq., codified at 15 U. S. C.

§§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), added new sections 13(d), 13(e) and 14(d)-(f)

to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 14(d)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act requires an offeror seeking to acquire more than five percent of any class of equity security by means of a tender offer to first file a
Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Schedule requires disclosure of the source of funds used to purchase the
target shares, past transctions v.ith the target company, and other material financial information about the offeror. In addition, the offeror must
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cated that MITE was willing to pay $28.00 per share for any
and all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet, a premium of approximately $4.00 over the then-prevailing market price.
MITE did not comply with the Illinois Act, however, and
commenced this litigation on the same day by filing an action
in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. The complaint asked for a declaratory judgment
that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and
violated the Commerce Clause. In addition, MITE sought a
temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent
injunctions prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from
enforcing the Illinois Act.
Chicago Rivet responded three days later by bringing suit
in Pennsylvania, where it conducted most of its business,
seeking to enjoin MITE from proceeding with its proposed
tender offer on the ground that the offer violated the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, 70 Pa. Stat. Ann., Title
70, § 711.19 (Supp. 1978). After MITE's efforts to obtain relief in Pennsylvania proved unsuccessful, 3 both Chicago
disclose any antitrust or other legal problems which might result from the
success of the offer. 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981). Section 14(d)(l) requires the offeror to publish or send a statement of the relevant facts contained in the Schedule 14D-1 to the shareholders of the target company.
In addition, § 13(d), also added by the Williams Act, requires a purchaser
of any equity security registered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 781, to file a schedule 13D with the Commission
within ten days after its purchases have exceeded five percent of the outstanding shares of the security. Schedule 13D requires essentially the
same disclosures as required by Schedule 14D-l. Compare 17 CFR
§240.13d-101 (1981) with 17 CFR §240.14d-100 (1981).
3
In addition to filing suit in state court, Chicago Rivet filed a complaint
·with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission requesting the Commission
to enforce the Pennsylvania Act against MITE. On January 31, 1979 the
Pennsylvania Securities Commission decided that it would not invoke the
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. The next day, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to which MITE
had removed the state court action, denied Chicago Rivet's motion for a
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Rivet and the Illinois Secretary of State took steps to invoke
the Illinois Act. On February 1, 1979, the Secretary of
State notified MITE that he intended to issue an order requiring it to cease and desist further efforts to make a tender
offer for Chicago Rivet. On February 2, 1979 Chicago Rivet
notified MITE by letter that it would file suit in Illinois state
court to enjoin the proposed tender offer. MITE renewed
its request for injunctive relief in the District Court and on
February 2 the District Court issued a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois
Act against MITE's tender offer for Chicago Rivet.
MITE then published its tender offer in the February 5
edition of the Wall Street Journal. The offer was made to all
shareholders of Chicago Rivet residing throughout the
United States. The outstanding stock was worth over $23
million at the offering price. On the same day Chicago Rivet
made an offer for approximately 40% of its own shares at
$30.00 per share. 4 The District Court entered final judgment on February 9, declaring that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and that it violated the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the District Court permanently
enjoined enforcement of the Illinois statute against MITE.
Shortly after final judgment was entered, MITE and Chicago
Rivet entered into an agreement whereby both tender offers
were withdrawn and MITE was given 30 days to examine the
books and records of Chicago Rivet. Under the agreement
MITE was either to make a tender offer of $31.00 per share
before March 12, 1979, which Chicago Rivet agreed not to oppose, or decide not to acquire Chicago Rivet's share or assets. App. to Brief for Appellees 1a-4a. On March 2, 1979,
MITE announced its decision not to make a tender offer.
temporary restraining order.
'Chicago Rivet's offer for its own shares was exempt from the requirements of the Illinois Act pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112,
§ 137.52-9(4) (Supp. 1980).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed sub n01n. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F. 2d 486
(1980). It agreed with the District Court that several provisions of the Illinois Act are preempted by the Williams Act
and that the Illinois Act unduly burdens interstate commerce
in violation of the Commerce Clause. We noted probable jurisdiction, 451 U. S. 968 (1981), and now affirm.

II
The Court of Appeals specifically found that this case was
not moot, 633 F. 2d, at 490, reasoning that because the Secretary has indicated he intends to enforce the Act against
MITE, a reversal of the judgment of the District Court would
expose MITE to civil and criminal liability 5 for making the
February 5, 1979 offer in violation of the Illinois Act. We
agree. It is urged that the preliminary injunction issued by
the District Court is a complete defense to civil or criminal
penalties. While that is not a frivolous question by any
means, it is an issue to be decided when and if the Secretary
of State initiates an action. That action would be foreclosed
if we agree with the Court of Appeals that t
·s Act is
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the case · not moot.
III
We first address the holding that the Illinois Takeover Act
is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. We note at
the outset that in passing the Williams Act, which is an
amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Congress did not also amend § 28(a) of the latter Act. 6 In pertinent part, § 28(a) provides as follows:
6
The Secretary of State may bring an action for civil penalties for violations of the Illinois Act., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.65 (Supp. 1980),
and a person who willfully violates the Act is subject to criminal prosecution. !d., at § 137.63.
6
There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress was
aware of state takeover laws when it enacted the Williams Act. When the
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"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of
the Securities Commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any state over any security or
any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder."
Thus Congress did not explicitly prohibit states from regulating takeovers; it left the determination whether the Illinois
statute conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts. Of
course, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually
conflicts with a valid federal statute; and,
"[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility
... ,' Flo1~da Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U. S. 132, 142--143 (1963), or where the state 'law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., supra, at 526, 540-541. Accord, De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 363 (2976)." Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 158 (1978).
Our inquiry is further narrowed in this case since there is no
contention that it would be impossible to comply with both
the provisions of the Williams Act and the more burdensome
requirements of the Illinois law. The issue thus is, as it was
in the Court of Appeals, whether the Illinois Act frustrates
the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way,
The Williams Act, passed in 1968, was the congressional
Williams Act was enacted in 1968, only Virginia had a takeover statute.
The Virginia statute, Va. Code§ 131-52S, became effective March 5, 1968;
the Williams Act was enacted several months later on July 19, 1968.
Takeover statutes are now in effect in 37 states. Sargent, On the Validity
of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42
Ohio St. L. J. 689, 690 n. 7 (1981).
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response to the increased use of cash tender offers in corporate acquisitions, a device that had "removed a substantial
number of corporate control contests from the reach of the
exsiting disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws." Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U. S. 1, 22
(1977). The Williams Act filled this regulatory gap. The
Act imposes several requirements. First, it requires that
upon the commencement of the tender offer, the offeror file
·with the SEC, publish or send to the shareholders of the target company, and furnish to the target company detailed information about the offer. 15 U. S. C. § 78(n)(d)(1), 17 CFR
§ 240.24d-3 (1981). The offeror must disclose information
about its background and identity; the source of the funds to
be used in making the purchase; the purpose of the purchase,
including any plans to liquidate the company or make major
changes in its corporate structure; and the extent of the
offeror's holdings in the target company. 15 U. S. C.
§ 78m(d)(l), 17 CFR § 240.13d-1 (1981). See also note 2,
supra. Second, stockholders who tender their shares may
withdraw them during the first seven days of a tender offer
and if the offeror has not yet purchased their shares, at any
time after sixty days from the commencement of the offer.
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5). ; Third, all shares tendered must be
purchased for the same price; if an offering price is increased,
those who have already tendered receive the benefit of the
increase. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(7). 8
; The seven-day withdrawal period contained in the Williams Act has
been extended to 15 business days by the Commission. 17 CFR
§ 240.14d-7(a)(1).
' The Williams Act also provides that when the number of shares tendered exceeds the number of shares sought in the offer, those shares tendered during the first 10 days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata
basis. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(6). The Act also contains a general antifraud
provision, 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e), which has been interpreted to require disclosure of material information known to the offeror even if disclosure was
not otherwise required. See, e. g. Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Welling-
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There is no question that in imposing these requirements,
Congress intended to protect investors. Piper v. ChrisCraft Industries, supra, at 35; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 58 (1975); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1967) ("Senate Report"). But it is also crystal
clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor
was to avoid tipping the scales in favor of either management
or the takeover bidder. As we noted in Piper, the disclosure
provisions originally embodied in 8.2731 "were avowedly promanagement in the target company's efforts to defeat takeover bids." 430 U. S., at 30. But Congress became convinced "that takeover bids should not be discouraged because
they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management." Senate Report at 3. 9
It also became apparent that entrenched management was often successful in defeating takeover attempts. As the legislation evolved, therefore, Congress disclaimed any "intention
to provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover
bids ... " Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58,
and expressly embraced a policy of neutrality. As Senator
Williams explained, "We have taken extreme care to avoid
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of
the persons making the takeover bids." 113 Cong. Rec.
24664 (1967). This policy of "evenhandedness", Pipe1· v.
Chris-Craft Industries, supra, at 31, represented a conviction that neither side in the contest should be extended additional advantages vis-a-vis the investor, who if furnished
with adequate information should be in a position to make his
own informed choice. We, therefore, agree with the Court
of Appeals that Congress sought to protect the investor not
ton Associates, 483 F. 2d 247, 250 (CA 2 1973).
• Congress also did not want to deny shareholders "the opportunities
which result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock of a given
company", namely the opportunity to sell shares for a premium over their
market price. 113 Cong. Ref. 24665 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
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only by furnishing him with the necessary information but
also by withholding from management or the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice. 633 F. 2d, at 496.
To implement this policy of investor protection while maintaining the balance between management and the bidder,
Congress required the latter to file with the Commission and
furnish the company and the investor with all information adequate to the occasion. With that filing, the offer could go
forward, stock could be tendered and purchased, but a stockholder was free within a specified time to withdraw his tendered shares. He was also protected if the offer was increased. Looking at this history as a whole, it appears to us,
as it did to the Court of Appeals, that Congress intended to
strike a balance between the investor, management and the
takeover bidder. The bidder was to furnish the investor and
the target company with adequate information but there was
no "intention to do . . . more than give incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its position."
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58. Once that
opportunity was extended, Congress anticipated that the investor, if he so chose, and the takeover bidder should be free
to move forward within the time-frame provided by
Congress.
IV
The Court of Appeals identified three provisions of the Illinois Act that upset the careful balance struck by Congress
and which therefore stand as obstacles to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in all essential respects.

A
The Illinois Act requires tender offerors to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to make a
tender offer and the material terms of the offer twenty busi-
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ness days before the offer becomes effective. Ill. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 121 112, §§ 137.54E, 137.54B (Supp. 1980.) During that
time, the offeror may not communicate its offer to the shareholders, id., at § 137.54A. Meanwhile, the target company
is free to disseminate information to its shareholders concerning the impending offer. The contrast with the Williams Act
is apparent. Under that Act, there is no pre-commencement
notification requirement; the critical date is the date a tender
offer is "first published or sent or given to security holders."
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(l). See also 17 CFR § 240.14d-2 (1981).
We agree ~ with the Court of Appeals that by providing
the target company with additional time within which to take
steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notification
provisions furnish incumbent management with a powerful
tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the
stockholders who will not have an offer before them during
this period. 10 These consequences are precisely what Congress determined should be avoided, and for this reason, the
precommencement notification provision frustrates the objectives of the Williams Act.
It is important to note in this respect that in the course of
events leading to the adoption of the Williams Act, Congress
several times refused to impose a precommencement disclosure requirement. In October 1965, Senator Williams introduced S.2731, a bill which would have required a bidder to
notify the target company and file a public statement with
the Securities and Exchange Commission at least 20 days before commencement of a cash tender offer for more than five
per cent of a class of the target company's securities. 111
Cong. Rec. 28259 (1965). The Commission commented on
the bill and stated that "the requirement of a 20-day advance
notice to the issuer and the Commission is unnecessary for
the protection of security holders ... " 112 Cong. Rec.
190005 (1966). Senator Williams introduced a new bill in
1967, S.510, which provided for a confidential filing by the
•• See note 11 and accompanying text, infra.
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tender offeror ·with the Commission five days prior to the
commencement of the offer. S.510 was enacted as the Williams Act after elimination of the advance disclosure requirement. As the Senate Report explained,
"At the hearings it was urged that this prior review was
not necessary and in some cases might delay the offer
when time was of the essence. In view of the authority
and responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission to take appropriate action in the event that inadequate or misleading information is disseminated to the
public to solicit acceptance of a tender offer, the bill as
approved by the committee requires only that the statement be on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission at the time the tender offer is first made to the
public." Senate Report at 4.
Congress rejected another pre-commencement notification
proposal during deliberations on the 1970 amendments to the
Williams Act. 11
B
For similar reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act frustrate the
congressional purpose by introducing extended delay into the
"H. R. 4285, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The bill was not reported out
of the subcommittee. Instead, the Senate amendments to the Williams
Act, which did not contain pre-commencement notification provisions,
were adopted. Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated detailed
rules governing the conduct of tender offers. Rule 14d-2(b), 17 CFR
§ 240.14d-2(b) (1981), requires that a tender offeror make its offer effective
within five days of publicly announcing the material terms of the offer by
disseminating specified information to shareholders and filing the requisite
documents with the Commission. Otherwise the offeror must announce
that it is withdrawing its offer. The events in this litigation took place
prior to the effective date of Rule 14d-2(b), and because Rule 14d-2(b) operates prospectively only, see 44 Fed. Reg. 70326 (1979), it is not at issue
in this case.
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tender offer process. The Illinois Act allows the Secretary
of State to call a hearing with respect to any tender offer subject to the Act, and the offer may not proceed until the hearing is completed. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, §§ 137.57A and
B. (Supp. 1980) The Secretary may call a hearing at any
time prior to the commencement of the offer, and there is no
deadline for the completion of the hearing.
I d., at
§§ 137.57C and D. Although the Secretary is to render a decision within 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, that
period may be extended without limitation. Not only does
the Secretary of State have the power to delay a tender offer
indefinitely, but incumbent management may also use the
hearing provisions of the Illinois Act to delay a tender offer.
The Secretary is required to call a hearing if requested to do
so by, among other persons, those who are located in Illinois
"as determined by post office address as shown on the
records of the target company and who hold of record or beneficially, or both, at least 10% of the outstanding shares of
any class of equity securities which is the subject of the takeover offer." !d., at § 137.57.A. Since incumbent management in many cases will control, either directly or indirectly,
10% of the target company's shares, this provision allows
management to delay the commencement of an offer by insisting on a hearing. As the Court of Appeals observed,
these provisions potentially afford management a "powerful
weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover." 633 F. 2d, at
494. 12 In enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself "recognized that delay can seriously impede a tender offer" and
sought to avoid it. G1·eat Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,
12
Delay has been characterized as "the most potent weapon in a tender
offer fight." Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 Cornell L. Q. 213, 238 (1977). See also
Wachtel!, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. L. 1433,
1437-1442 (1977); Wilner and Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover
Laws and Their Constitutionality, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 9--10 (1976).
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577 F. 2d 1256, 1277 (CA5 1978); Senate Report at 4. 13
Congress reemphasized the consequences of delay when it
enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 15 U. S. C. 12, et seq.
"[l]t is clear that this short waiting period [the ten-day
period for proration provided for by § 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act, which applies only after a tender
offer is commenced] was founded on congressional concern that a longer delay might unduly favor the target
firm's incumbent management, and permit them to frustrate many pro-competitive cash tenders. This ten-day
waiting period thus underscores the basic purpose of the
Williams Act-to maintain a neutral policy towards cash
tender offers, by avoiding lengthy delays that might discourage their chances for success." H. R. Rep. No.
94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976). 14
3
' According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, delay enables
a target company to:
"(1) repurchase its own securities;
"(2) announce dividend increases or stock splits;
"(3) issue additional shares of stock;
"(4) acquire other companies to produce an antitrust violation should the
tender offer succeed;
"(5) arrange a defensive merger;
"(6) enter into restrictive loan agreements ,
"(7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer." Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae 10, n. 8.
" Representative Rodino set out the consequences of delay in greater
detail when he described the relationship between the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act and the Williams Act:
"In the case of cash tender offers, more so than in other mergers, the equities include time and the danger of undue delay. This bill in no way intends to repeal or reverse the congresional purpose underlying the 1968
Williams Act, or the 1970 amendments to that act. . . . Lengthier delays
will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer, by abolishing
cumulative voting, arranging a speedy defense merger, quickly incorporating in a State with an antitakeover statute, or negotiating costly lifetime
employment contracts for incumbent menagement. And the longer the
waiting period, the more the target's stock may be bid up in the market,
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As we have said, Congress anticipated investors and the
takeover offeror be free to go forward ¥.'ithout unreasonable
delay. The potential for delay provided by the hearing provisions upset the balance struck by Congress by favoring
management at the expense of stockholders. We therefore
agree with the Court of Appeals that these hearing provisions conflict with the Williams Act.

c
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Illinois Act is
pre-empted by the Williams Act insofar as it ~s th~ec
retary of State .2f Illinois to pass on the substantive fairn~s
of a-tender offer. Unaer "§131.'57EOhhel1Iinois law, the
Secretary i;;e'Quired to deny registration of a takeover offer
if he finds that the offer "fails to provide full and fair disclosure to the offerees ... or that the take-over offer is inequitable .... " (Emphasis added). 15 The Court of Appeals understood the Williams Act and its legislative history to
indicate that Congress intended for investors to be free to
make their own decisions. We agree. Both the House and
Senate Reports observed that the Act was designed to "make
the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair
opportunity to make their decision." H. R. Rep. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968); Senate Rept. at 3. Thus, as
the Court of Appeals said, "the state thus offers investor protection at the expense of investor autonomy-an approach
making the offer more costly-and less successful. Should this happen, it
will mean that shareholders of the target firm will be effectively deprived
of the choice that cash tenders give to them: Either accept the offer and
thereby gain the tendered premium, or reject the offer. Generally, the
courts have construed the Williams Act so as to maintain these two options
for the target company's shareholders, and the House conferees contemplate that the courts will continue to do so." 122 Cong. Rec. 30877 (1976).
6
' Appellant argues that the Illinois Act does not permit him to ajudicate
the substantive fairness of a tender offer. Brief for Appellant 21-22. On
this state-law issue, however, we follow the view of the Court of Appeals
that§ 137.57.E allows the Secretary of State "to pass upon the substantive
fairness of a tender offer... ." 633 F. 2d, at 493.
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quite in conflict ·with that adopted by Congress." 633 F. 2d,
at 494.

v

The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have
Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several
states." U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "[A]t least since
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852), it has been
clear that 'the Commerce Clause. . . . even without implementin le "slation by Congress is a lfm1tabon upon the
power of the tates. '
rea
an tc · act c ea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366, 370--371 (1976), quoting Freeman v.
Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). See also Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 35 (1980). Not
every exercise of state power with some impact on interstate
commerce is invalid. A state statute must be upheld if it
"regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental . . . unless the burden iumposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 141 (1970), citing
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443 (1960).
The Commerce Clause, however, permits only incidental
regulation of interstate commerce by the states; direct regulation is prohibited. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268
U. S. 189, 199 (1925). The Illinois Act violates these principles for two reasons. First:' it directly reg:Ulates interstate
commerce through the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Second, the burden the Act imposes on interstate commerce is excessive in light of the local interests the Act purports to further.
A
States have traditionally regulated intrastate securities
transactions, 16 and this Court has upheld the authority of

I

'

6

For example, the Illinois Blue Sky law, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 112,
et seq. (Supp. 1980), provides that securities subject to the law

§ 137.1,
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states to enact "blue-sky" laws against Commerce Clause
challenges on several occasions. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U. S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards
Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co.,
242 U. S. 568 (1917). The Court's rationale for upholding
the state laws was that the laws only regulated transactions
occurring within the regulated states. "The provisions of
the law . . . apply to dispositions of securities within the
State and while information of those issued in other States
and foreign countries is required to be filed ... they are only
affected by the requirement of a license of one who deals with
them within the State. . . . Such regulations affect interstate commerce in securities only incidentally." Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., supra, at 557-558 (cites omitted). Congress
has also recognized the validity of such laws governing intrastate securities transactions in § 28a of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a), a provision "designed to
save state blue-sky laws from preemption." Leroy v. Great
Western Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 182, n. 13 (1979).
The Illinois Act differs subtantially from state blue-sky (
laws in that it directly regulates transactions which take
place across state lines, even if wholly outside the state of Illinois. Although in this case some 27% of Chicago Rivet's
shareholders were Illinois residents, the Illinois Act applied
to transactions with any of its shareholders, wherever located. Also, it would have applied even if none of Chicago
Rivet's shareholders were Illinois residents, since the Act applies to every tender offer for a corporation meeting two of
the following conditions: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under Illinois laws, or
has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented in Illinois.
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112,
§ 137.52-10.(2) (Supp. 1980). Thus the Act could be applied
to regulate a tender offer which would not affect a single Illinois shareholder.

I

must be registered "prior to sale in this State . . . " ld., at§ 137.5.

'?
I
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The Illinois statute has S\\'eeping extraterritorial effect.
A tender offer for the securities of a publicly-held corporation
is ordinarily communicated by use of the mails or other
means of interstate commerce to shareholders across the
country and abroad; securities are tendered to the offeror by
similar means. Yet the Illinois Act operates directly on
these interstate transactions even when they take place entirely outside the state. The Commerce Clause has long precluded the application of a statute such as the Illinois Act to
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the state's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the
state. In Shafer v. Farrners Grain Co., supra, at 199, the
Court held that "a state statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens ... [interstate] commerce is a prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the
purpose with which it was enacted." See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 806 (1976). Similarly,
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 775 (1945),
the Court struck down on Commerce Clause grounds a state
law where the "practical effect of such regulation is to control
... [conduct] beyond the boundaries of the state .... "
The limits on a state's power to enact substantive legislation are similar to the limits on the jurisdiction of state
courts. In either case, "any attempt 'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the
State's power." Shafer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 197
(1977). Because the Illinois Act purports to regulate directly conduct occurring wholly outside the state, it must be
held invalid as were the laws at issue in Shafe1· and Southern
Pacific.
B
The Illinois Act is also unconstitutional under the test of
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S., at 142, for even when
a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the
burden imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in
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relation to the local interests served by the statute. The
most obvious burden the Illinois Act imposes on interstate
commerce arises from the statute's previously-described extraterritorial reach which purports to give Illinois the power
to determine whether a nationwide tender offer may proceed.
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to
block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a
premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their
highest-valued use, a process which can improve efficiency
and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer
mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well
so that stock prices remain high is reduced.
See
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1161, 117~1174 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 5, 27-28, 45
(1978); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1976).
Appellant claims the Illinois Act furthers two legitimate
local interests. He argues that Illinois seeks to protect resident security holders and that the Act merely regulates the
internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that these asserted interests are insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois imposes on interstate commerce.
While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state
objective, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
non-resident shareholders. Insofar as the Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed
in the balance to sustain the law. We note, furthermore,
that the Act completely exempts from coverage a corporation's acquisition of its own shares. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121
112, § 137.52.09(4). Thus Chicago Rivet was able to make a
competing tender offer for its own stock without complying
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with the Illinois Act, leaving Chicago Rivet's shareholders to
depend only on the protections afforded them by federal securities law, protections which Illinois views as inadequate to
protect investors in other contexts. This distinction is at
variance with Illinois' asserted legislative purpose, and tends
to undermine appellant's justification for the burdens the
statute imposes on interstate commerce.
We are also unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially
enhances the shareholders' position. The Illinois Act seeks
to protect shareholders of a company subject to a tender offer
by requiring disclosures regarding the offer, assuring that
shareholders have adequate time to decide whether to tender
their shares, and according shareholders withdrawal, proration and equal consideration rights. However, the Williams
Act provides these same substantive protections, compare
Ill. Rev. Ann. Stat., ch. 121112, §§ 137.59.C, D, and E (Supp.
1980) (withdrawal, proration, and equal consideration rights)
with 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5), (6) and (7) and 17 CFR
§ 240.14d-7 (same). As the Court of Appeals noted, the disclosures required by the Illinois Act which go beyond those
mandated by the Williams Act and the regulations pursuant
to it may not substantially enhance the shareholders' ability
to make informed decisions. 633 F. 2d, at 500. It also was
of the view that the possible benefits of the potential delays
required by the Act may be outweighed by the increased risk
that the tender offer will fail due to defensive tactics employed by incumbent management. We are unprepared to
disagree with the Court of Appeals in these respects, and
conclude that the protections the Illinois Act affords resident
security holders are, for the most part, speculative.
Appellant also contends that Illinois has an interest in
regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated
under its laws. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of
laws principle which recognizes that only one state should
have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or be-
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tween the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be
faced with conflicting demands. See Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws, § 302, Comment b at 307-308 (1971).
That doctrine is of little use to the state in this context. The
Illinois Act applies to tender offers for any corporation for
which 10% of the outstanding shares are held by Illinois residents, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.52-10 (Supp. 1980).
The Act thus applies to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and have their principal place of business in
other states. Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.
We conclude with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act
imposes a substantial on interstate commerce which outweighs its putative local benefits. It is accordingly invalid
under the Commerce Clause.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

